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ABSTRACT
Peers play an important role in shaping behavior in many contexts. In this dissertation, I study
the role of peer interactions on key educational outcomes. In Chapter One, I implement a field
experiment to examine the role of social interactions in creating spillover effects. Spillover
effects happen when individuals are indirectly affected by an intervention through exposure to
other treated individuals. In the experiment, I randomly assign college students in an intro-
ductory statistics course to a low-cost behavioral intervention. Treated students receive advice
and prompts to make exam study plans. I measure a naturally formed peer network and exploit
the exogenous variation in exposure to the intervention in order to causally estimate spillover
effects on study behaviors that are transmitted through study partners. I construct a simple so-
cial learning model. Additional behavioral evidence further supports the model and I show that
the positive spillover effects on untreated students are mostly driven by treated partners who
have high beliefs about the return to the applet usage. Surprisingly, I find circumstances under
which social interactions reduce the treatment effect. Taken together, this paper provides causal
evidence of spillover effects on behavior due to peer interactions and unpacks the complexities
behind spillover effects. My results highlight that in networked environments, policy makers
should take peer effects into consideration not only to correctly evaluate, but also to leverage
social learning to maximize policy impacts.
In Chapter Two, I study a natural experiment that randomly assigns students into study
groups and estimate the effect of studying with peers of certain characteristics. I find little
evidence that peers’ background academic performances have significant effects on the course
final grade using the traditional linear in the mean model. I find that the group gender mix
has an economically and statistically significant impact. In particular, being in groups with
xi
more female peers leads to an increase in the course grade for both female and male students.
I exploit the course website’s log data, and find that one is more likely to download course
materials when in more female groups. This is a plausible mechanism through which the
gender mix affects the grades. I also find that studying with peers from another lecture section
marginally improves one’s course grade. My paper therefore provides practical suggestions for
assigning students into study groups.
In Chapter Three, we use a longitudinal survey design and follow college freshman, in order
to provide evidence for two separate mechanisms (homophily and influence) behind similarity
in peers’ behaviors. This paper demonstrates these effects for the subtle (but broadly important)
underlying economic preferences, rather than the observable but potentially domain-specific
behaviors previously studied. Subjects participate in three waves of an online experiment where
we elicit their social network using an incentive compatible mechanism and then measure par-
ticipants’ levels of altruism, willingness to take risks, and willingness to delay rewards using
diagnostic tasks. We find that subjects’ risk and time preferences are significantly positively
correlated with the preferences of their friends, consistent with peer influence on preferences.
Additionally, we find that changes in subject’s social networks are significantly influenced by
social preferences. Subjects are more likely to add someone as a friend, and less likely to drop
as a friend, the more similar their social preferences are.
xii
Chapter 1
With a Little Help from Your Friends: A Field
Experiment on Spillover Effects of Making Study
Plans on Student Learning
1.1 Introduction
Social networks characterize pathways for behavior to propagate. Peers transmit information
and influence every sphere of choice: academic performance, job search and career choice,
productivity at work, product choice, and voting behavior (Bandiera et al., 2010; Fafchamps
and Vicente, 2013; Marmaros and Sacerdote, 2002; Mobius et al., 2005; Sacerdote, 2001). In
experimental settings, policy makers and economists have been interested in estimating both
treatment effects as well as spillover effects. Spillovers happen when individuals are indi-
rectly affected by an intervention through exposure to other treated individuals. While many
have examined spillover effects on untreated individuals, few have studied spillovers within
the treatment groups except Fafchamps and Vicente (2013) and Fafchamps et al. (2013). My
experimental design allows me to ask whether social interactions amplify or abate the direct
treatment effect. This can inform policy makers of better treatment assignments. In addition,
unpacking the mechanisms through which peer interactions generate spillovers is also impor-
tant for policy makers to better leverage social network to scale up policy impacts.
In this paper, I use a field experiment to study the spillover effects of an educational in-
1
tervention on student learning. I situate my study in an introductory college statistics course
because it offers a large-scale social network and objective performance measures. Classrooms
are a principal workplace for students, and a major domain wherein academic relationships
form between students. With the experimental design, I measure two types of spillover ef-
fects: 1) how untreated students change behavior due to exposure to the intervention through
peers and 2) whether social interactions reinforce or mitigate the treatment effect among the
treated. The intervention features planning activities designed to help students engage in active
studying for exams. Combining social network elicitation and the random assignment of the
intervention, I causally identify spillover effects from existing self-selected study partners on a
variety of outcomes.1
To define relevant peer groups, I adopt a network elicitation protocol that allows students to
identify study partners that they interact with. I ask students to name anyone with whom they
talk about the course or study for exams. I directly elicit a student’s social network to define
relevant peers while previous studies rely on geographic closeness to define peers (Bobba and
Gignoux, 2016; Duflo and Saez, 2003; Miguel and Kremer, 2004). I do so because existing
evidence suggests that self-selected peer groups may be critical for researchers to “look in the
right place” in order to capture peer influence. Earlier work in psychology and sociology sug-
gests that individuals with whom one associates or with whom one shares a similar identity
are more influential (Cialdini and Garde, 1987; Granovetter, 1985; Tajfel and Turner, 1979).2
Recent economics studies show that peer influence can vary with how researchers construct
peer groups (Carrell et al., 2009), and that policy recommendations based on exogenous group
assignment, without accounting for self-selected peer group formations, can backfire (Carrell
et al., 2013). The study partnerships I elicit are pertinent for spreading course related infor-
mation and study behavior.3 These relationships, and the larger networks they create, play
1According to Harrison and List (2004), my experiment can be classified as a natural field experiment where
“the environment is one where the subjects naturally undertake these tasks and where the subjects do not know
that they are in an experiment.”
2“The term identity is used to describe a person’s social category - a person is a man or a woman, a black or
a white, a manager or a worker. The term identity is also used to describe a person’s self-image. It captures how
people feel about themselves, as well as how those feelings depend upon their actions.” (Akerlof and Kranton,
2005, p12)
3Student feedback from previous semesters shows that students who claim to have the “perfect study partner”
score higher than those who claim to “know someone that they would like to study with”. Students knowing no
one in the class score the lowest. See Appendix Figure A.1. This evidence suggests that having a study partner,
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an important role in shaping students’ educational experiences and outcomes (Betts and Zau,
2004; Hanushek et al., 2003; Hoxby, 2000; Wentzel, 1998). From here on, I will refer to study
partners as “partners” for short.
The intervention works in the following way. Before the exams, treated students receive
both advice on the importance of planning and prompts to plan time and material use in prepa-
ration for exams. There are two types of prompts. My “time use” planning prompts ask stu-
dents to write down reasonable and specific time plans about when to study for exams. My
“material use” planning prompts ask students to choose what study materials to use and then to
write down reasons for choosing certain materials to study for exams. These planning prompts
have been shown to effectively nudge individuals towards a wide range of desirable behaviors
(Rogers et al., 2015). Planning ahead reduces students’ uncertainty in how they will study,
by inducing them to commit to a plan. I focus on this low-cost intervention that is built upon
the insights of behavioral science whereas previous studies have focused on spillovers of more
substantial interventions such as providing subsidies for poor kids to go to school (Bobba and
Gignoux, 2016) or offering medical treatments to eradicate life-threatening diseases (Miguel
and Kremer, 2004). However, these programs are costly and not applicable to students in my
experimental context (a U.S. flagship state university).
My identification relies on the random assignment of the intervention at the individual level
and exploits the resulting exogenous variation in the exposure to the intervention through peers,
conditional on the total number of partners a student has. My approach is different from much
of the literature that causally estimates peer effects by using random peer group assignment
(Carrell et al., 2009; Foster, 2006; Lu and Anderson, 2015; Sacerdote, 2001; Xu, 2016; Zim-
merman, 2003).4 Instead of manipulating the network, I manipulate an individual’s exposure
to the intervention in the elicited partner network.
With the intervention targeting how students prepare for exams, I choose to examine stu-
and knowing who that partner is, influences course achievement.
4This literature faces the challenge of defining relevant peers. Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2006) argue that
randomly assigned roommates should not be viewed as relevant peers since a student “may find that there are many
other students at the school who have more compatible interests and preferences than his/her [randomly assigned]
roommates”. This might also be one reason why Sacerdote (2001) finds that randomly assigned roommates have
an impact on both college GPA and decisions to join fraternities, but Foster (2006) finds no evidence supporting
influence from roommates.
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dents’ usage of an online learning technology (hereafter referred to as “the applet”) as the
primary outcome of interest. This applet has become a popular practice tool for students and
is likely to be a social tool that partners use together. The communal or cooperative nature of
the applet makes its usage subject to peer influence. The availability of high-frequency and
objective online usage data helps unpack channels through which the partners affect a student’s
technology adoption. The main outcomes are the take-up of the applet and the intensity of use.
I also collect other self-reported study behavior such as time spent on studying for exams.
I find that the intervention has an overall positive effect on the applet usage. Without any
treated partners, a treated student is 15% more likely to use the applet compared to an untreated
student. This the direct treatment effect. On the intensive margin, a treated student increases
the frequency of usage by 35%. More importantly, I find a positive spillover effect on untreated
students. An untreated student is about 5% more likely to use the applet when they have an
additional treated partner. The spillover effect is about 30% of the direct treatment effect, both
on the extensive and intensive margin. Contrary to the positive spillover effects on untreated
students, I find overall insignificant spillover effects on treated students. In other words, treated
students are much less likely to be affected by the exposure to treated partners than untreated
students. I then exploit variations in tie strength and show that treated partners who tend to in-
teract more intensively (e.g. mutually listed partners, exam study partners) are more influential
than their counterparts (e.g. unilaterally listed partners, general talking partners).
These results motivate a model with social learning as a potential channel for spillovers,
whereby students share beliefs about the usefulness of the applet.5 I construct a simple social
learning model where students choose applet usage but face uncertainty of the return to usage.
I assume the intervention decreases belief uncertainties in the return because treated students
have already been prompted to make a plan. With social learning, students learn from their
partners about the return and update beliefs. Following the stylized results, I allow the strength
of social learning to differ based on tie strength. Not only can the model explain the observed
spillover effects, it also generates an additional prediction for testing: The higher a partner’s
5I do this to follow previous work on tool adoption, which has shown that learning the parameters of a new
technology from others is a key information transmission channel.
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belief is about the return, the more the partner will encourage an individual to use the applet.
To test the model, I use the study plans that treated students write down to infer their beliefs
about the return from using the applet. I classify those who plan (do not plan) to use the applet
as having a high (low) belief. I find supporting evidence for the model which offers additional
policy implications. First, I find that the positive spillover effects on untreated students mostly
come from treated partners who also plan to use the applet. This evidence implies that exposure
to treated partners is not a sufficient condition for spillovers to happen. Rather exposure to the
“right” individuals – those who also have a willingness to use the applet is a key for leveraging
social networks to scale up policy effects. Second, I find circumstances under which peer
interactions backfire – social interactions can mitigate the treatment effect.6 When a pair of
treated partners have contrasting plans (i.e. one plans to use the applet while the other one does
not), the negative effect from the one who does not plan to use the applet is large enough to
offset the treatment effect. This highlights a situation where treating everyone might not be
ideal and policy makers need to be more careful about treatment targeting.
Throughout, I focus the discussion around social learning as a channel that potentially trans-
mits spillover effects within a network. There are, however, other plausible explanations. For
instance, the spread of applet take-up can happen if there are economies of scale or complemen-
tarities in using the applet.7 While the existing data has not yet allowed me to verify or falsify
the alternative explanations, I note that this alternative explanation is unlikely to explain all the
results, especially why social interactions can mitigate treatment effect among the treated.8
Regarding performance outcomes, treated students prepare better for lab discussion sections
as measured by the scores from their pre-lab assignments. Having treated peers also positively
affects untreated students’ pre-lab assignment scores. The relative size of the spillover effect
6The literature on the interaction between spillover effects and intervention offers mixed results. Babcock and
Hartman (2010) find that peer interactions reinforce the effect of financial incentives on students’ propensity to
exercise. Fafchamps and Vicente (2013) also find positive reinforcement of a voter education program on violence
related perceptions. In contrast, Fafchamps et al. (2013) find a negative reinforcement effect of a similar voter
education campaign on voter turnout.
7Economies of scale characterize a situation where when one partner adopts the applet, other partners’ cost
of using the applet decreases. Use complementarities occur if one partner’s marginal utility of using the applet
increases when another partner adopts it.
8I use Bramoullé et al. (2009) to identify the endogenous peer effect parameter but I am constrained by weak
instruments.
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compared to the treatment effect is about 30%, similar to that from the applet use. While the
intervention improves this intermediary performance outcome, I do not find any statistically
significant treatment effects on exam scores and course grades. The self-reported study habits
suggest that treated students might be substituting between the applet and other materials. The
lack of evidence of spillover effects on aggregate performance outcomes calls for future work
on the effectiveness of the applet, and also highlight the benefit of collecting behavioral data to
uncover policy spillovers.
This study contributes to a growing volume of literature on estimating peer effects in higher
education, with a particular focus on self-selected peers. The ability to use objective and real
time applet usage allows me to better measure behavior and provide evidence of social learning,
adding to the few empirical studies that explore potential mechanisms behind peer influence.
My results highlight the necessity of taking peer effects into consideration when assigning
interventions in a networked environment.
1.2 Study Context and Experimental Design
1.2.1 Study Context
My study context is a large introductory statistics class at a US four-year flagship public uni-
versity. This course is required for many science major students.9 The course is worth 4 credits
for three hours of lectures and an additional one-hour lab session each week. There are 6 lec-
ture sections taught by 4 different lecturers and 68 lab sections taught by 36 different graduate
teaching assistants. The syllabus provides students with detailed and important course informa-
tion such as course learning objectives, schedule, grading methods, three exam dates, and other
important details. Hence there is little uncertainty about the course contents. The course has an
online website called StatsOnline, which has been used previously for multiple semesters. Both
the instructors and the teaching assistants encourage students to use this website for course re-
lated activities such as looking up exam scores, browsing study tips, and doing online practice
exercises. In short, this website is an important part of the course and students use it frequently.
9These majors include Computer Science, Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Information Science, Bio-
Psychology, Neuroscience, and Environment majors.
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Figure 1.1: Timeline
The course is not curved.
1.2.2 Experimental Design
My experimental design features three waves of surveys and two waves of intervention mes-
sages throughout the semester. Figure 1.1 is a detailed timeline for the course. It describes the
timing of each exam and the experiment implementation.
As can be seen from the timeline illustration, at the beginning of the semester, all registered
students are invited to complete two baseline surveys.10 In the first survey, I collect background
information such as whether they have declared a major and student organization affiliations.
I get demographic information and official high school and college GPA data from the Office
of the Registrar. Then in the second survey, I ask students about their past statistics course
experience and expectations going into the semester. These data are used for the balance check.
The first exam (Exam 1), takes place roughly a month after the semester starts. 10 days
before Exam 2, I send out a Pre-E2 Message through StatsOnline that contains the intervention
to ask students to plan for exam preparation. Within each lecture section, I randomly select
25% of the students to be in the baseline group. The baseline group students receive a Pre-E2
Message which is a reminder of the exam time and date. The remaining 75% of the students are
in the treatment group. In addition to the reminder, the treatment group students also receive
advice and prompts to make study plans. The purpose of the prompts is to engage students
10The teaching assistants reserve the last 10 minutes of the first two lab sessions for students to take these
surveys.
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with active and self-regulated learning which is an important input in education (Duckworth
and Seligman, 2005; Pintrich and De Groot, 1990). In particular, a third of the treated students
receive advice on the importance of planning time use and see an example of a reasonable time
plan. Then students do a time use planning activity - they write down a specific and reasonable
time plan for exam preparation. Another third receive advice on the importance of planning
material use and see a sample reason of why practice exam questions are an effective study
material for exam preparation. Then students do a material use planning activity - they select
materials that they believe are most effective for exam preparation and provide justifications for
their selections. The remaining one third do both planning activities. Students can review their
plans throughout the semester via StatsOnline. Both activities prompt students to make plans.
Those planning prompts can encourage desirable behaviors in many different contexts.11 In the
course context, these planning prompts may function as a commitment device or a reminder and
thus change how students study for exams. I argue that the prompts can help reduce students’
uncertainty regarding how to study for exams, by inducing students to commit to a plan and
helping students avoid distractions. For example, through planning, students can better foresee
and remove logistical barriers. This can help students avoid distractions due to planning fallacy
(i.e. underestimate how long studying takes).12
Since this paper aims to estimate the spillover effects from peers’ exposure to the prompts,
I will pool the three arms together. In Figure A.3a and A.3b I show screenshots of the interven-
tion prompts.
I send out the Post-E2 Survey online to elicit the study partner network one day after Exam
2. In particular, I ask students whom within the course they have talked to about this course
so far (such as discussing lecture slides and working on homework questions). Figure 1.3
displays the user interface of the study partner elicitation. Students can search by name and
the interface displays both exact matches and close matches in the case of typos.13 Using a
11These behaviors include getting flu vaccines (Milkman et al., 2011), voting (Greenwald et al., 1987; Nickerson
and Rogers, 2010), purchase of a product (Morwitz et al., 1993) and so on.
12Other benefits of the prompts can also contribute to reducing the uncertainty. Planning can help strengthen
their self-efficacy (i.e. belief in succeeding) and ease exam anxiety, which can reduce the uncertainty in exam
preparation process as well. For a detailed discussion on why prompting people to make plans is effective at
inducing positive behavioral changes, see Rogers et al. (2015).
13I have received emails about not being able to find names from the system. In most situations, students are
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(a) Prompt to Plan Time Use
(b) Prompt to Plan Material Use
Figure 1.2: Intervention Prompts
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Figure 1.3: Eliciting Study Partners
similar interface, students also select partners within the course whom they study together with
for Exam 2 specifically. I choose such an elicitation protocol to make it as easy as possible for
students to list names. I do not limit how many study partners one can list. I also provide no
incentives for listing partners that are more likely to reciprocate. Other studies have constrained
how many friends one can list and/or have provided incentives for mutually listed friends (e.g.
Leider et al. (2009)). I do not provide incentives for the study partner elicitation since it does
not fit well with the course design.14
I choose to elicit the network after the intervention to avoid focusing students’ attention
on studying with others. If I were to elicit the network before or together with the Pre-E2
Message, I might prime control students to think about study partners since they do not see
other alternatives for preparing for exams in the Pre-E2 Message.
One potential concern of eliciting the network after the intervention is that the intervention
may change whom students study with. If this is happening, then treated students’ partners will
be different from those of the untreated. In the results section, I do not find such differences. I
trying to find someone who took the course in a previous semester. Sometimes students cannot remember another
student whom they happened to talk to during pooled office hours.
14The study partner elicitation yields an over 50% agreement rate on the study partner relationship, which
indicates that the elicitation is quite successful even without the incentives. For a survey on network elicitation
methods, see Brañas-Garza et al. (2013).
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also show that the treatment assignment cannot predict study partnerships or changes in study
partnerships between the two exams.
For Exam 3, I repeat the same pre-exam message and post-exam survey. I keep the treatment
assignment constant between Exam 2 and 3. To incentivize participation, all the pre-exam
messages and the post-exam surveys are awarded with 2 extra homework credits out of 100
total homework points.15 Students have one week to complete the surveys online.
1.2.3 The Applet
The key study behavior I focus on is the use of an online learning applet with practice questions
to help students understand applications of statistical concepts and tests. The applet is embed-
ded in StatsOnline and is available to students after the first exam. Each question presents
students with a scenario and then students choose appropriate concepts or appropriate statisti-
cal tests to apply given the scenario. After students submit the answers, the applet will provide
explanations on why the chosen answer is right or wrong. Figure 1.4 shows a screenshot of a
question. The applet is designed for this statistics course and has been used previously.
The applet has the following features that make it an outcome of interest. First, students
find the applet to be helpful for exams because the applet questions are similar to those on the
exams.16 Second, although the applet is rated as helpful, not every student uses the applet yet.
In the plans students write, about half mention to use the applet. The applet is the fifth mostly
mentioned material in student’s plans.17 These two stylized facts suggest that there is room for
the applet usage to be affected by the intervention.
Third, the applet is also a social tool which partners use together when studying together.
Figure 1.5 provides descriptive evidence to support this claim. The upper solid line plots out the
fraction of partner pairs that have ever used the applet (y-axis) within a window of 10, 20, 30,...,
up to 120 minutes (x-axis). About 10% pairs use the applet within the ten-minute window and
15Homework accounts for about 10% of the final course grade.
16Based on two semesters of course feedback data, the median helpfulness rating of the applet is 3 on a scale of
1 to 4.
17The five frequently mentioned materials are, in descending order, lecture notes, formula cards, past and
practice exams, past homework, and the applet.
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Figure 1.4: A Sample Question from the Online Learning Applet
12
Figure 1.5: Potential Contagious Applet Usage
25% use the applet within two hours.18 I then contrast the upper solid line to the lower solid one
with confidence intervals. This line shows the fraction of randomly paired study partners using
the applet within a certain window.19 The obvious gap between the two solid lines suggests that
study partners are more likely to use the applet together. Similarly, I generate two dashed lines
for fractions of pairs reviewing the exam preparation summary document through StatsOnline
within a certain window.20 The fact that the solid lines are much higher than the dashed lines
shows that using the applet is more social than reviewing summary documents. This feature
suggests the applet usage might be subject to peer effects.
1.2.4 Datasets
In my analysis, I will use the following four datasets:
1) The dataset obtained from the Registrar and the Office of Greek Life: This dataset has
demographic and academic achievement data, and Greek organizations membership.
2) The survey dataset: This dataset has students’ self-reported past experience with statistics
1850% pairs use within a day.
19In each simulation, I keep total partners a student has the same while rewiring the links. The confidence
intervals are from 100 simulations.
20This summary document includes advice for studying for exams, and contents covered by each exam.
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courses, expectations about the courses and other background information from the baseline
surveys, exam study plans from the pre-exam surveys, the self-reported study partnerships and
study behaviors from the post-exam surveys.
3) The applet usage dataset: This dataset has objective measures of applet usage obtained
from the log file of StatsOnline.
4) The performance dataset: This dataset has detailed course performance measures are
available from the instructors.
1.3 The Network and Data Descriptives
In this section, I first provide an overview of the endogenous study partner network. I look at
the factors that predict partnerships. Then I describe the final sample for the empirics.
1.3.1 The Study Partner Network Descriptives
A total of 1564 (73%) out the 2156 registered students responded to the network elicitation
questions after Exam 2 and 1896 (88%) respond to the Post-Exam 3 Survey. Among the
post-exam survey respondents, a third of them do not list any study partners. The remain-
ing two-thirds list on average two study partners, and are listed back as a study partner as well
with a 50% probability.21 Even though my network elicitation protocol is not incentivized,
the reciprocation rate of 50% is high compared to previous studies with network elicitations
(Chandrasekhar and Lewis, 2011). I then construct an “or” network where two students are
considered as study partners as long as one of them lists the other either as a talking partner or
an exam study partner. Previous literature has primarily used the “or” relationship to construct
network (e.g. Conley and Udry (2010); Mobius et al. (2005)). The advantage of using the “or”
relationship is that it reduces measurement errors if students forget to recall every study partner.
The disadvantage of using the “or” is that it also captures more weak ties than strong ties. As
is discussed in section 4.1, the spillover effects can be downward biased due to the “or” defini-
tion. I will exploit the directionality of the partnerships and compare the effects from mutually
versus unilaterally listed partners to argue for social learning as a potential mechanism.
21This is conditional on that a listed partner also takes the survey.
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Figure 3 displays a visualization of the elicited “or” network after Exam 2. Dark nodes
represent untreated students and white represent treated students. A link connects two study
partners as long as one of them lists the other as a study partner. For exposition reasons, in this
figure I exclude isolated nodes. The nodes are not densely connected to each other based on
the colors, which partially alleviates the concern that the treatment affects network formation.
The elicited network exhibits characteristics that are consistent with the previous literature:
students sort into study partnerships based on common characteristics - a phenomenon known
as homophily.22 Table 1.1 examines the predictors for one to list another student from the same
lecture section after Exam 2.23 In column (1), each row is a separate logit regression. The
dependent variable is whether one lists another student from the same lecture as his/her study
partner, and the predictor is an indicator for sharing some common characteristics or a char-
acteristic of a potential study partner. Each regression also controls for individual gender and
high school and college GPA. All the indicators for two people sharing the same attributes are
positive and significantly different from zero, indicating homophily in the network - students
are more likely to study with someone sharing similar attributes. Three most predictive fac-
tors are being in the same lab section, being in the same student organization, and being of
the same gender. However black students are less likely to be listed as a study partner (β =
-0.0006, p 0.05). Column (2) is a joint logit regression with all the characteristics included. A
student is on average 0.21% more likely to name a study partner from the same lab section than
from another section. There is some evidence suggesting that a student selects partners based
on their academic performance measures. The estimates on a partner’s high school GPA and
college GPA are marginally statistically significant.
Columns (3) and (4) examine the predictors for link reciprocity - how likely it is that two
students both agree that they are study partners. A student is more likely to be listed back as a
partner as well by another student of same gender (β = 0.074, p   0.001). High school GPA
becomes a strong predictor for link reciprocity (β = 0.226, p   0.001). Being in the same
22Also consistent with the education literature (Bruun and Brewe, 2013; Calvo-Armengo et al., 2009; Maroulis
and Gomez, 2008), network position can predict student achievements. Table A.4 show that the correlation be-
tween the centrality measures and grades become even more positive and significant over time.
23Due to the large size of the course, I choose to do so at the lecture section level.
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Figure 1.6: A Visualization of the Study Partner Network
Notes: This is a part of the “or” network using response from the Post-Exam 2 Survey. I pool
the talking and exam study partners together. Isolated students are not shown in the graph.
Treated students are white and untreated students are in gray.
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student organization does not predict link reciprocation (β = 0.046, p ¡ 0.1). The coefficient in
front of the total number of study partners a student lists is negative (β = -0.093, p   0.01). A
student is less likely to be listed back the more partners he/she lists. One plausible explanation
is that students are listing partners in order based on tie strength.
Table 1.1: Predictors for Partnerships Elicited in Post-Exam 2 Survey
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logit Unilaterally Unilaterally Mutually Mutually
List List List List
(SourceÑTarget) (SourceÑTarget) (SourceØTarget) (SourceØTarget)
Same Gender 0.0012*** 0.0009*** 0.066** 0.074***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.028) (0.028)
Same Student Org. 0.0020*** 0.0013*** 0.0423 0.046
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.029) (0.030)
Same Cohort 0.0009*** 0.0006*** 0.023 0.0304
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.024) (0.024)
Same Ethnicity 0.0008*** 0.0006*** 0.014 0.009
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.024) (0.024)
Same Major 0.0009*** 0.0005*** 0.006 0.009
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.024) (0.024)
Same Lab Section 0.0025*** 0.0021** 0.012 0.001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.032) (0.032)
Target’s HS GPA 0.0009*** 0.0005* 0.208*** 0.226***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.076) (0.079)
Target’s College GPA 0.0007*** 0.0004* -0.018 -0.090
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.031) (0.070)
Target Being Female 0.0003*** 0.114***
(0.0001) (0.027)
Target Being Black -0.0006** -0.059
(0.0003) (0.080)
Total # Partners Listed -0.024*** -0.0224***
(0.006) (0.006)
Obs. 727,578 1782
Notes: The results are based on responses to the network elicitation after Exam 2. “Same Student Org.” equals to 1 if two students are in the
same fraternity or sorority organization. “HS GPA” is the high school GPA. “College GPA” is the official cumulative college GPA before the
winter 2015 semester. Each regression controls for gender, HS GPA and College GPA. In column (1) and (2), the independent variable of
the logit regression is whether a student lists another student from the same lecture (“Target”) as his/her study partner. In column (1), each
estimate is from a separate univariate regression. Column (2) is a joint regression with all the independent variables. In column (3) and (4), the
independent variable of the logit regression is whether a listed student (“Target”) also lists the student back. Column (4) is a joint regression
with all the independent variables. All the estimates are average marginal effects.
In Table A.2 I compare the two networks, one elicited after Exam 2 and the other elicited
after Exam 3, in order to see what predicts the network dynamics. First, a student’s treatment
status is not predictive of the deletion of the partnership. A treated student is as equally likely
as a control student to drop a partner or to be dropped by a partner. Second, new partnership
establishment is also unlikely to be driven by the treatment assignment. I consider students
from the same lab section as potential study partners since being in the same lab section is
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predictive of nominating a partner in Table 1.1. A control student and a treated student are
equally likely to add or to be added by someone from the same lab section. This is evidence
suggesting that it is unlikely that students are strategically changing partnerships in response to
the treatment.24 At the student level, there are changes in partnerships. At the whole network
level, the network property measures are similar between Exam 2 and 3.25 In the following
sections I use the “or” network elicited after Exam 2.
1.3.2 Sample and Balance Check
I include the 1564 students who respond to the network elicitation questions after Exam 2 in my
final sample of analysis. I choose not to include the non-respondents. As can be seen in Table
A.1, the nonrespondents are more likely to be male, black and upperclassmen (sophomore,
junior, and senior students). These nonrespondents are more likely to withdraw from the course
and those who stay also have lower exam scores compared to the respondents.
Of the final sample, 407 (26%) are thus in the control condition, and the rest 1157 (74%)
are in the treatment condition. Table 1.2 presents the summary statistics of the treated and the
untreated students in this class.
First, this table shows that students’ demographic variables are balanced between the un-
treated and the treated group. Students do not differ on their academic background perfor-
mances measured by high school GPA, college GPA, and Exam 1 score. Course expectations
in terms of studying with someone else and the amount of time to be spent on this course also
do not differ by the treatment assignment.
Secondly, treated and control students are equally likely to have actually received the pre-
exam messages. I do so by tracking whether students view and especially respond to the
prompts in the pre-exam messages. As is shown in Table 1.2, both the Pre-Exam 2 Mes-
sage and the Pre-Exam 3 Message have a response rate over 80% and the response rates do not
differ by the treatment assignment. I then qualitatively check treated students’ responses to the




Table 1.2: Balance Table
Untreated Treated T Test OLS
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Diff. t stat. Coeff. on (S.E.)
#Treated
Panel A: Demographics
Age 19.3 1.38 407 19.2 1.26 1157 -0.105 -1.42 -0.003 (0.032)
Exam 1 Score 60.1 9.82 407 60.9 9.61 1157 0.812 1.46 0.554 (0.374)
High School GPA 3.842 0.220 407 3.841 0.196 1157 -0.001 -0.13 -0.001 (0.006)
College GPA 3.421 0.409 401 3.411 0.416 1137 -0.010 -0.43 0.002 (0.012)
Female 0.597 0.491 407 0.571 0.495 1157 -0.026 -0.90 -0.022 (0.018)
White 0.671 0.471 407 0.698 0.459 1157 0.028 1.04 -0.013 (0.019)
Black 0.039 0.195 407 0.034 0.181 1157 -0.006 -0.53 0.006 (0.005)
Asian 0.270 0.445 407 0.251 0.434 1157 -0.020 -0.78 -0.006 (0.019)
Hispanic 0.025 0.155 407 0.041 0.197 1157 0.016 1.49 -0.005 (0.007)
In CAS* 0.825 0.380 406 0.847 0.360 1157 0.022 1.04 0.005 (0.012)
Major Declared 0.319 0.467 407 0.309 0.462 1157 -0.011 -0.41 0.002 (0.015)
Live Off Campus 0.409 0.492 386 0.429 0.495 1092 0.019 0.66 -0.005 (0.017)
Panel B: Course Specific Responses
#Semesters of Stats. 0.535 0.816 385 0.514 0.786 1083 -0.021 -0.44 0.026 (0.031)
#hr/week Study 19.31 8.233 384 18.77 8.292 1082 -0.217 -1.15 0.354 (0.300)
#hr/week Study Stats. 5.30 3.374 384 5.08 3.108 1083 -0.544 -1.11 0.001 (0.122)
Will Study w. Others 0.802 0.399 384 0.791 0.407 1083 -0.011 -0.45 0.004 (0.013)
Panel C: Pre-Exam Message Take-up
Pre-Exam 2 0.929 0.258 407 0.935 0.246 1157 -0.015 -0.80 -0.014* (0.007)
Pre-Exam 3 0.892 0.920 407 0.920 0.272 1157 -0.001 -0.04 -0.012 (0.010)
Panel D: Partner Characteristics
#Total 2.6 2.06 407 2.8 2.09 1157 0.156 1.30
N/A#Treated 1.9 1.66 407 2.1 1.72 1157 0.155 1.55
Exam 1 Score 60.25 0.345 353 60.42 0.209 1035 0.170 0.41
Female 0.353 0.612 353 0.577 0.012 1035 -0.036 -1.47
Notes: All the variables except “Live Off Campus” in Panel A are from the Registrar dataset. CAS stands for College of Arts and Science.
The rest of the variables, except partners’ scores and gender, are from the survey dataset. The last two columns present the coefficients and the
standard errors of the treatment dummy in OLS regressions for balance checks. A joint F-test with the first and the second group of variables
has an F-statistic of 1.11 and a p-value of 0.28.
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Figure 1.7: Distribution of Total Number of Partners
More importantly, I test the validity of the randomization of treated partners. I begin by
checking whether the treated students select partners differently from the control students. If
the treatment does cause the network formation process to differ between the students, then
there should be differences in how many partners one has or partners’ characteristics. Panel D
in the balance table rules this out. On average, a student has about three partners in total and
two of them are treated. The realized likelihood of partners being assigned as treated (1.9/2.6
= 73% for the control and 2.1/2.8 = 75% for the treated) is close to the treatment assignment
rate at 75%. Total partners, the number of treated partners, partners’ Exam 1 score, and gender
are also balanced. Figure 1.7 plots out the distribution of the number of total partners a student
has by treatment. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test cannot reject that the distributions are the same.
I also regress each baseline characteristics of interest on the number of treated partners and
indicators of total friends, in order to test for the central exogeneity assumption that condi-
tional on the total number of partners, the number of treated partners is randomly assigned.
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Coefficients on the number of treated partners from these regressions are shown in the last col-
umn. In most cases, these coefficients are small and statistically insignificant, suggesting the
randomization is successful.
These checks warrants the empirical strategy to estimate peer effects based on the elicited
network after Exam 2.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Empirical Strategy
Recall that the intervention is randomized at the individual level. Although students choose
whom to study with, the number of partners getting the intervention is random conditional on
the total number of partners. By exploring the exogenous variation in the number of partners
treated, I can identify both the treatment effect and the spillover effects from treated partners,
on outcomes of interest (Y). In particular, I run the following regression:
Yi  α  β
Ti   γFriTreatedi   ρtTi FriTreatediu  
¸
k1
θk1pTotali  kq   σXi   εi (1.1)
where “Ti” is the treatment indicator. “FriTreatedi” is the number of study partners receiving
the treatment information. “Totali” is the total number of study partners. I use a dummy indica-
tor for the number of total partners to allow for more flexibility instead of imposing a functional
form. Xi includes individual control variables such as gender, lecture section, cohort, Exam
1 score, and high school and official cumulative college GPA. I include an interaction term
between “FriTreatedi” and the student’s own treatment indicator. This allows me to capture
differential effects of peer exposure depending on own treatment status. β is the direct treat-
ment effect. Both γ and ρ are my key estimates of spillover effects. γ is the effect of having an
additional treated partner when i self is untreated. γ   ρ is the effect of having an additional
treated partner when i self is treated. 26
Now I discuss how network measurement error can potentially bias my results from the
26The estimation strategy follows Miguel and Kremer (2004) and Oster and Thornton (2012).
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above regression. If students randomly forget to report some partners, then both γ and ρ are
overestimated. This is because for each additional treated partner I observe, the true number
of additionally treated partners is larger. In other words, under-reporting scales the number
of treated partners down. On the flip side, if students report too many partner whom they do
not interact with, then both γ and ρ are underestimated. By using the “or” network construc-
tion, I am more likely to have over-reporting than under-reporting and hence underestimate the
spillover effects.27 If misreporting is not random, for example, if students are more likely to
report treated than untreated partners, then both γ and ρ are overestimated if an unobservable
that positively correlates with the number of total friends is also positively correlated with the
outcomes.
One way to circumvent potential measurement errors is to use the fraction, instead of the
count, of partners treated. Because of random assignment, the fraction of partners treated is
exogenous, even unconditional on the total number of partners. The data confirm that the
number of treated friends indeed is proportional to the number of total friends. For a more
accessible interpretation, I choose to present results from using the count in the results section.
I include the results from the alternative specification with fraction treated as a robustness check
and the main results are qualitatively unchanged (See Appendix Table A.5).28
1.4.2 Applet Usage as an Outcome
The primary objective measure of study behaviors is applet usage: whether a student takes up
the applet and how many questions a student answers. Figure 1.8 provides descriptive evidence
of spillover effects on applet usage among the untreated. For exposition purposes, I only show
the results for untreated students with fewer than five partners (which accounts for about 70%
of the total sample). The y-axis corresponds to the fraction of students ever using the applet
in Figure 1.8a and corresponds to the number of questions answered through the applet in
Figure 1.8b. The x-axis in both figures corresponds to the number of treated partners one has,
conditional on the total number of partners a student has. Both figures show an upward slope
27Oster and Thornton (2012) find that peer influence is smaller under the “or” network compared to the “and”
network.
28This alternative estimation strategy has been used in Cai et al. (2015). Oster and Thornton (2012) find quali-
tatively the same results using both estimation strategies.
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in applet usage with more treated partners.
To quantify the spillover effect, Table 1.3 shows the estimated effect sizes. In Panel A,
the binary outcome variable is whether a student has ever used the applet for exam study. I
stack the regressions for Exam 2 and 3 together and add in exam fixed effects in addition to the
independent variables described before in section 1.4.1. On average, 55.5% of the untreated
students with no treated partner use the applet. Column (1) uses a linear probability model.
Column (2) is a logit regression and the estimates are average marginal effects. The estimates
in column (3) are the average marginal effects on answering at least one question, estimated by a
Tobit model (used in Panel B). Those three specifications yield estimates of similar magnitudes.
The direct treatment effect, β, is about 0.073 and is statistically significant at the 10% level.
Thus the treatment increases a student’s likelihood of using the applet by about 7.3 percentage
points, or 15% relative to the control mean. The estimated γ is around 0.02. This means that
having an additional treated partner makes an untreated student 2 percentage point more likely
to use the applet. Although γ is not statistically significantly different from 0, its magnitude
is worth noting. The estimated peer effect on an untreated student is about 30% of the direct
treatment effect ( 0.020
0.072
). The interaction term, ρ, has a negative sign, and is statistically
significantly different from 0. This means that the spillover effects on a treated student are
much smaller than that on an untreated student. The effect of having a treated partner on
a treated student is γ   ρ. To test for whether treated students benefit from being with an
additional treated partners, I report the p-value for the test under the null hypothesis that γ   ρ
equals to zero for each column. The p-values are large and the point estimates of γ   ρ are
negatively signed, which means that the treated students do not increase their take-up of the
applet significantly from being with other treated students around them.
In Panel B, I look at the intensive margin — how many questions students answer using the
applet. Column (1) is an OLS regression. The estimates reported in column (2) are the aver-
age marginal effects on the censored outcome from a Tobit model. The last two columns use
count models: a Poisson regression and a negative binomial regression (in case of a potentially
over-dispersed range of the number questions answered). The magnitudes of the estimates are
similar across different functional forms in the four columns. Receiving the treatment makes a
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(a) Likelihood of Ever Using the Applet
(b) Number of Questions Answered
Figure 1.8: Descriptive Evidence of Spillover Effects on Applet Usage of Untreated
Notes: The y-axis corresponds to the fraction of students ever using the applet in figure (a) and corresponds to the number of questions
answered through the applet in figure (b). The x-axis in both figures corresponds to the number of treated partners one has. I plot out graphs
by the total number of partners one has.
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student answer 6 more questions, or 35% more questions relative to the control mean of 16.83.
An additional treated partner makes an untreated student answer two more questions on aver-
age. The estimated peer effect is also about 30% of the direct treatment effect ( 2.320
5.990
), similar
to what I find on the extensive margin. The interaction term is statistically significantly differ-
ent from 0 as well. A Wald test shows that on the intensive margin, the treated students also do
not increase their intensity of use from studying with other treated students (p¡0.7).
Table 1.3: Treatment and Spillover Effects on Applet Use
Panel A: (1) (2) (3)
Ever Used LPM Logit Tobit
Ti (β) 0.072* 0.072** 0.073**
(0.038) (0.036) (0.029)
FriTreatedi (γ) 0.020 0.022 0.025*
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
Ti*FriTreatedi (ρ) -0.028** -0.030** -0.029***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
Control Mean 0.555 0.555 0.555
Control S.D. (0.498) (0.498) (0.498)
p-value: γ   ρ  0 0.506 0.561 0.720
Obs. 3054 3054 3054
Panel B: (1) (2) (3) (4)
#Questions OLS Tobit Poisson Negative
Answered Binomial
Ti (β) 5.990** 5.983** 6.779** 6.792**
(2.358) (2.445) (2.739) (2.902)
FriTreatedi (γ) 2.320 2.043* 2.375* 2.026*
(1.402) (1.073) (1.261) (1.082)
Ti*FriTreatedi (ρ) -2.486** -2.352*** -2.610*** -2.272**
(1.042) (0.868) (1.007) (0.997)
Control Mean 16.83 16.83 16.83 16.83
Control S.D. (23.17) (23.17) (23.17) (23.17)
p-value: γ   ρ  0 0.874 0.720 0.809 0.776
Obs. 3054 3054 3054 3054
Notes: All the columns stack results from Exam 2 and 3 together. “Ever Used” in Panel A equals to 1 if a student has used the applet for at
least once for exam studying, and 0 otherwise. “#Questions” in Panel B counts the number of questions a student answers through the applet.
The estimates are the mean marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered at the lab section level (68 clusters). The network is constructed
based on the network elicited after Exam 2, using the “or” definition. The individual controls included, but not shown here, are gender, official
college cumulative and high school GPA, cohort and lecture section dummies, and Exam 1 test score. Control mean is the mean outcome for
an untreated student with no treated study buddies. The p-value shown is under the null hypothesis that there are no peer effects on the treated
student.
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The above results show that the intervention of asking students to make study plans has
positive impacts on applet usage. It is interesting to see whether the effectiveness of the nudge
varies with students’ baseline test scores (Exam 1 score). On one hand, students with higher
academic ability measured by their Exam 1 score may respond less to the intervention since
they might already have good study habits. On the other hand, students with higher test scores
may respond more to the intervention since they might in general pay more attention to the
intervention messages. In Table 1.4 column (1) to (4), I break the sample by students’ baseline
Exam 1 test score into four quartiles. In general the direct treatment effect is larger for students
with a higher than median Exam 1 score. Focusing on the take-up in Panel A, I find that the
direct treatment effect, β, is smaller on students with below median Exam 1 scores compared to
other students. Moreover, students with lower Exam 1 scores are also less likely to be affected
by treated peers as reflected by the magnitudes of the γ estimates. In Panel B, the treatment
effect is in general larger for students with higher Exam 1 scores. Students in the bottom
quartile only answer on average about 1.5 more questions. The heterogeneous impacts by initial
exam scores suggest an interesting interaction between test performance and the intervention.
Notice that both in Panel A and in Panel B, the control means of students with lower Exam 1
scores are much higher than those of students with higher scores. This might be another reason
for a larger intervention impact on the above median students. In general, from Figure 1.4
and Table 1.4, the spillover effects on untreated students are consistently positive, while social
interactions do not appear to reinforce the treatment effect among the already treated students.
1.4.3 Spillovers and Tie Strength
So far, I have estimated an average spillover effect from additional treated partner without dis-
tinguishing tie strength. A large volume of literature in social psychology and social networks
has shown that stronger ties are more likely to exert influence on behavior (Aral and Walker,
2014; Bakshy et al., 2012; Bond et al., 2012). The network data allow me to proximate tie
strength. I separately define strong ties as: Partners who study together for exams are more
likely to be strong ties than partners who only talk about the course materials; Pairs of students
who mutually list each other as study partners are more likely to be strong ties than pairs of
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Table 1.4: Spillover Effects by Exam 1 Test Scores
Panel A: OLS (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ever Used Bottom Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile Top Quartile
Ti (β) -0.020 -0.001 0.192*** 0.108*
(0.068) (0.073) (0.056) (0.055)
FriTreatedi (γ) -0.010 0.005 0.056** 0.012
(0.028) (0.025) (0.028) (0.032)
Ti*FriTreatedi (ρ) 0.007 -0.033 -0.049** -0.014
(0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023)
Control Mean 0.625 0.630 0.423 0.536
Control S.D. (0.489) (0.488) (0.499) (0.508)
p-value: γ   ρ  0 0.931 0.156 0.742 0.933
Obs. 772 850 826 606
Panel B: Poisson (1) (2) (3) (4)
# Questions Bottom Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile Top Quartile
Ti (β) 1.446 6.099 12.830** 7.755*
(4.765) (5.056) (6.159) (4.782)
FriTreatedi (γ) 2.207 0.972 4.168 1.358
(2.462) (2.112) (2.983) (2.673)
Ti*FriTreatedi (ρ) 0.289 -3.268 -3.560 -2.759
(1.988) (2.042) (2.275) (1.777)
Control Mean 22.84 19.04 10.19 13.50
Control S.D. (26.57) (21.45) (15.83) (27.23)
p-value: γ   ρ  0 0.239 0.160 0.802 0.419
Obs. 772 850 826 606
Notes: All the columns stack results from Exam 2 and 3 together. “Ever Used” in Panel A equals to 1 if a student has used the applet for at
least once for exam studying, and 0 otherwise. “#Questions” in Panel B counts the number of questions a student answers through the applet,
and the estimates are the mean marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered at the lab section level (68 clusters). The network is constructed
based on the network elicited after Exam 2, using the “or” definition. The individual controls included but not shown here are the same as
before. Control mean in each column is the mean outcome for an untreated student with no treated study buddies and with an Exam 1 test
score corresponding to each quartile. The p-value shown is under the null hypothesis that there are no peer effects on the treated student.
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students where one student unilaterally lists the anothe; Partners who have fewer other study
partners to study with are also more likely to be strong ties since the fewer partners one has,
the more time one can afford to study with each partner.
To separately estimate spillover effects from strong versus weak ties, I split the number of
treated peers and run the following regression:
















  θk1pTotali  kq   σXi   εi
(1.2)
“FriTreatedstrong1i ” counts the number of treated partners who are strong ties. The count of
remaining partners is given by “FriTreatedstrong0i ”. I also add two interaction terms between
these two counts and the treatment dummy.
Results in Table 1.5 show that strong ties are associated with stronger spillovers. Column
(1) separates exam study partners from general course study partners. Column (2) splits the
treated partners by whether their degree is above the median degree. Column (3) distinguishes
treated partners who mutually list each other as a study partner from other treated partners.
Consistent with the hypotheses, the point estimates of γ1 is larger than that of γ0. Especially on
the extensive margin in Panel A, the null hypotheses that γ0  γ1 can be rejected at the 10%
level.29
The above finding that γ1 is larger than γ0 is suggestive of a social learning mechanism.
Strong ties might be more likely to share information about study strategies such as the benefit
of making study plans or using the applet. Without detailed data on conversations among study
partners or how they study together, it is difficult to pin down the exact mechanism. In order to
test this mechanism, I will next propose a theoretical model for this social learning process and
show evidence to support this mechanism.
29Oster and Thornton (2012) find statistically larger peer effects from strong ties than from weak ties. Cai et al.
(2015) find qualitatively the same result but do not test the significance of the difference.
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Table 1.5: Spillovers Depend on Tie Strength
Panel A: OLS Ever Used
(1) (2) (3) (4)
strong =1 if Exam Low Mutually Plan to
Partner Degree List Use Applet
T (β) 0.072* 0.086** 0.074* 0.074*
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
FriTreatedc1 (γ1) 0.040** 0.063** 0.032* 0.049***
(0.017) (0.024) (0.017) (0.018)
FriTreatedc0 (γ0) 0.005 0.005 0.013 -0.008
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
Fri w.o. a Plan 0.071
(0.045)
H0: γ1  γ0
p-value: 0.085 0.041 0.354 0.017
Obs. 3054 3054 3054 3054
Panel B: Poisson #Questions Answered
(1) (2) (3) (4)
strong =1 if Exam Low Mutually Plan to
Partner Degree List Use Applet
T (β) 6.757** 7.695*** 6.902** 7.034**
(2.750) (2.845) (2.758) (2.776)
FriTreatedc1 (γ1) 3.704* 5.103** 3.940* 4.738***
(1.939) (2.160) (2.023) (1.807)
FriTreatedc0 (γ0) 1.370 1.351 1.474 0.349
(1.454) (1.451) (1.269) (1.644)
Fri w.o. a Plan 3.632
(3.565)
H0: γ1  γ0
p-value: 0.310 0.140 0.231 0.038
Obs. 3054 3054 3054 3054
Notes: All the columns stack results from Exam 2 and 3 together. “Ever Used” in Panel A equals to 1 if a student has used the applet for at
least once for exam studying, and 0 otherwise. “#Questions” in Panel B counts the number of questions a student answers through the applet,
and the estimates are the mean marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered at the lab section level (68 clusters). The network is constructed
based on the network elicited after Exam 2, using the “or” definition. The individual controls included but not shown here are the same as
before. The p-value shown is under the null hypothesis that treated partners who are more likely to share plans have the same magnitude of
influence as those who less likely to share plans.
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1.5 A Simple Social Learning Model
In this model, I assume students choose applet usage to maximize the expected utility from us-
ing the applet, which can increase their grades.30 To form expectations, students can learn from
their partners about the return of the applet usage. The key assumption is that the intervention
reduces uncertainty in the return on applet usage. I allow for the strength of social learning to
differ based on the tie strength. I first derive two model predictions that map to the main results
from Section 4. I then test an additional model prediction and show supporting evidence.
1.5.1 A Model for Applet Usage
A student i chooses, ei, how effort she should spend on the applet. The resulting utility is a
function of the grade, Gi and the cost of time spent, ke2i . I assume a quadratic cost function
where k ¡ 0 for increasing marginal costs.
Uipeiq  fpGipeiq, eiq  Gipeiq mG
2
i peiq  ke
2
i (1.3)
Gipeiq  G0i   eiv (1.4)
Ifm is positive (negative), then the marginal return of a higher grade is increasing (decreasing).
I only assume that m   1
2G0i
. G0i is the grade that i gets without using the applet. The return
from using the applet is v, unknown to students. For exposition purposes, I assume v to be the
same for all the students. When making study decisions, students face uncertainty in v. Such
uncertainty can arise from not knowing how helpful the applet is in general for everyone. It
can also rise from not knowing how helpful the applet is in particular for oneself. Students thus
have a belief over v. I use bi to denote the belief over v.
bi  Npµi, σ
2
i q
30I can arrive at the same comparative statics under a social learning model used by development economists
(e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) and Bandiera and Rasul (2006)). See Appendix A for this alternative model.
30
The belief of v, bi, is an independently identically distributed normal random variable with a
mean of µi and a variance of σ2i . The key assumption in my model is that the intervention
reduces σ2i . This is because the prompts can induce students to plan ahead, to preemptively
think about the effectiveness of different study activities and to have a commitment device to
avoid distractions.31 Following this argument, I assume that the returns to applet usage are
more predictable for treated students: σ2pTi  1q   σ2pTi  0q.32 I follow the literature on
social learning (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995) and assume that σ2
is known for both T=0 and T=1.
Students choose ei to maximize the utility specified in (3). Plugging (4) into (3) and taking





mpµi   σ2i q   k
 (1.5)




  0. Under the condition that m is not too big, i.e.
m   1
2G0i




¡ 0 in the Appendix. In other words, the optimal applet usage is
increasing with a more precise belief (i.e. a smaller σ2i ) and a higher mean belief about the
return (i.e. a larger µi). It is also straightforward to see that under the assumption that treated
students have a smaller σ2, treated students use the applet more. This maps to the positive
treatment effect estimate, β.33
When students learn about v from partners, social learning will reduce the variance in bi and
affect applet usage choice. To see that I now integrate social learning into the choice model.
31For example, students who do not plan ahead might be crunched for time. As a consequence, they might
experience a higher level of mental anxiety or more difficulties to smooth out the preparation process. Thus they
might face a higher level of uncertainty about the return to applet usage.
32It is possible that the treated students increases µi, especially those students who choose to use the applet.
I will include this extension later in the model and show that treated partners who plan to use the applet can
influence a student’s propensity to use the applet differently from those who do not mention to use the applet in
the plan. Allowing for treated students to have higher µi does not change comparative statics and the main model
predictions.




  0. This may explain why students with higher initial Exam 1 scores
use the applet less in subsequent exam preparation.
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1.5.2 Social Learning
With social learning, students learn about partners’ beliefs about the return of the applet from
talking or observing partners’ applet usage. Each new signal from a partner j, bj , is distributed
as Npµj, σ2j q. I allow the strength of the information, aij P p0, 1q, to differ based on the
tie strength. A higher aij means a higher likelihood that i learns about j’s belief. Students































Two main predictions thus follow and can explain the results in section 1.4. First, if a student
learns from every study partner, then the model predicts that information from a treated partner
decreases the variance in beliefs more than the information from an untreated partner because
σ2pTj  1q   σ
2pTj  0q. This predicts a positive spillover effect estimate, ρ, on the applet
usage of the untreated students.34
Second, the effect of learning from more treated partners is smaller for students with a more
precise belief on the return. This predicts that the effect of having a treated partner is smaller
on a treated student than on an untreated student. In my analysis in section 1.4, this is captured
as a negative estimate, γ, on the interaction term.
In addition, if I allow treated partners to differ in their mean beliefs, µj , then a treated
partner who thinks that the return is high makes a student more likely to use the applet. This is
because a higher µj leads to a higher µ1i. This is an additional prediction that can be tested by
the data. Next I will show evidence that further supports this prediction.
34This also predicts a positive correlation between the number of partners one has and the applet take up. This
is what I observed in 1.5. See Figure AA.3 in the Appendix.
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1.5.3 Testing the Model
Although I do not elicit beliefs directly, treated students’ study plans provide a way to approx-
imate beliefs. Students who explicitly mention to use the applet in their plans are more likely
to have higher beliefs than those who do not mention the applet. Therefore, following equation
(2), I split the number of treated partners a student i has by whether the partners (denoted by j)
mention to use the applet in the exam plan (counted by FriTreateda1):
Yi  α   β













  θk1pTotali  kq   σXi   εi
(1.8)
The model predicts that γ1 and γ1   ρ1 should be positive and γ1 and γ0   ρ0 should
be negative. Table 1.6 column (1) and (2) show estimates separately for γ and γ   ρ. Panel A
column (1) shows that a treated partner with a willingness to use the applet increases a student’s
likelihood to use the applet by 4.9 percentage points and the estimate is strongly statistically
significant. In contrast, the spillover estimate from a treated partner without a plan to use the
applet is statistically insignificant and negative (-0.007, s.e. = 0.018). I notice the same pattern
on the intensive margin. Panel B column (1) shows that a treated partner with a willingness
to use the applet makes a student answer 4.616 more questions. The finding that the positive
spillover effects on untreated students mostly come from treated partners who also planned to
use the applet implies that exposure to treated partners is not a sufficient condition for spillovers
to happen. Rather exposure to the “right” individuals – those who also have a willingness to
use the applet is a key for leveraging social networks to scale up policy effects.
Interestingly column (2) in Panel A and B shows that a negative influence from partners
who did not plan to use the applet. The estimates become statistically significant in column
(3) when I restrict to the sample of treated students with a willingness to use the applet. These
students are 5.3 percentage points less likely to use the applet and answer 7 fewer questions
with an additional treated partner who did not plan to use the applet. Recall from Table 1.3, the
direct treatment effect on the extensive and intensive margin is about 0.073 and 6 respectively.
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Table 1.6: Evidence for Social Learning
Panel A: OLS Ever Used
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Partner pair ij, When i is untreated treated treated and treated but did
planned to use not plan to use
j Planned to Use Applet 0.049*** 0.005 -0.003 -0.011
(0.018) (0.015) (0.021) (0.019)
j Did Not Plan to Use Applet -0.007 -0.015 -0.053*** -0.006
(0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.022)
j Did Not Make a Plan 0.071 -0.038* -0.028 -0.058
(0.045) (0.021) (0.033) (0.037)
Controls Y Y Y Y
Obs. 3054 3054 882 1118
Panel B: Poisson #Questions Answered
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Partner pair ij, When i is untreated treated treated and treated but did
planned to use not plan to use
Planned to Use Applet 4.616** 1.504 0.138 1.040
(2.770) (1.180) (1.966) (4.278)
Did Not Plan to Use Applet 0.295 -2.000* -7.014*** -0.043
(1.658) (1.024) (2.157) (2.221)
Did Not Make a Plan 3.607 1.075 -1.823 2.450
(3.549) (2.510) (4.551) (100.82)
Controls Y Y Y Y
Obs. 3054 3054 882 1118
Notes: The results stack Exam 2 and 3 together. “Ever Used” is a binary dependent variable. “#Questions Answered” equals to the number of
applet questions a student answers. All standard errors are clustered at the lab section level shown in the brackets (67 clusters). The network
is constructed based on the network elicited after Exam 2, using the “or” definition. The individual controls included but not shown here are
the same as before.
The large negative influence from the low belief treated partners is large enough to offset the
direct treatment effect. This highlights circumstances under which peer interactions mitigate
the treatment effect and alerts policy makers to be careful about treatment assignment. Even in
a setting where everyone can be treated, it might not be optimal to treat everyone.
The results in Table 1.6 provide in general consistent support for the social learning model
where high belief partners encourage and low belief partners discourage the applet usage.
1.5.4 Other Predictions for Future Testing
Additionally, the model generates predictions ripe for testing in future work. For example, the
model predicts that while learning from partners increases the belief precision, the posterior
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mean can decrease if the ratio of the signal mean to the signal variance is small. In other words,
a student may lower her mean belief when her partner’s signal is too noisy even when the
partner has a high usage. For example, if the partner changes study plan frequently, then the
partner’s high use of the applet can be a mere chance. Another example of such scenario is in
financial markets where information that signals a high return associates with a high volatility
as well. Future lab or field experiments can help understand the relative effect of signal mean
and variance.
1.6 Discussion
1.6.1 Other Potential Mechanisms
There are several other channels through which peer exposure to the intervention could also
affect a student’s applet usage. For example, students might be learning about the interven-
tion message advocating for efficient exam preparation and it is the spread of the intervention
message that leads to the spillover effects on behavior. However, I would argue that this mech-
anism cannot explain why social interactions can mitigate treatment among a subset of the
treated students.
Another potential mechanism is the spread of the applet take-up happens when there are
economies of scale or complementarity in using the applet. This channel predicts that a high
usage of partners also causes a student to use more; Manksi (1993) refers to this as the endoge-
nous peer effect. To test this, in the Appendix, I use a linear in the mean peer effects model to
causally estimate the endogenous peer effect using the instrumental variable approach proposed
by Bramoullé et al. (2009). While limited by the weak instruments to estimate the endogenous
peer effect credibly, I argue that this alternative explanation is unlikely to explain the differen-
tial spillover effects from different ties I find in the data.
1.6.2 Scores as Outcomes
Recall that the treatment makes a student use the applet. it is natural to ask whether this increase
in exam preparation leads to better performance outcomes. On the other hand, since scores are
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noisy measures and there are other study efforts, performance might not change significantly.35
To estimate the effects of treatment and peer exposure on scores as outcomes, I run regres-
sions based on Equation (1) using individual preparatory lab assignment scores, exam scores,
and course grades as outcomes.
I find that the treatment affects how well students prepare for lab sections. Before each
lab section, students complete a pre-lab assignment in order to prepare for the upcoming lab
assignments. In Table 1.3 column (3), I use the accumulated pre-lab assignment scores since
the Pre-Exam 2 message. The treatment increases the score by 0.649. This is equivalent to a 4%
increase or a 0.15 standard deviation increase relative to the control mean. Having an additional
treated partner also increases a control student’s score by 0.172. The relative peer effect is
about 27%, similar to the estimates from the applet usage data. The negative and statistically
significant estimate for the interaction term is consistent with the previous conclusions from
Table 1.3 column (2) and (3) that peer exposure does not have a significant effect on treated
students.
Using exam scores and course grades outcomes, I find that the estimate of the treatment
dummy in Table 1.7 is largely small and insignificant. Averaging over the two exams, a treated
student without any treated partners scores 0.0009 standard deviations lower than a control
student without any treated partners. For reference, the control mean is 0.047, with a standard
deviation of 0.888. For aggregate course performance, I show results using different measures.
The course has two methods to calculate the final course grade and the larger one becomes the
final course GPA. Exposure to treated peers affects course performance very little, whether I
use the two grade calculation methods separately in column (3) and (4) or the official course
GPA in column (5).
These zero results on performance, despite the positive effects on efforts through the applet
usage and lab section preparation, can be due to multiple reasons. One reason is that the
increase in effort inputs does not map directly to gains in exam scores. The pre-lab assignments
35I find a correlation of 0.15 between study partners’ scores. The magnitude is similar to that in Sacerdote (2001)
who finds that roommates’ first year college GPA has a correlation of 0.11. See Figure A.2 in the Appendix.
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Table 1.7: Spillover Effects on Performance
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Course Grade
Pre-Lab Exam Score Method1 Method2 Final Grade
Ti (β) 0.649** -0.009 0.218 -0.006 -0.009
(0.323) (0.054) (0.700) (0.724) (0.052)
FriTreatedi (γ) 0.172* 0.001 0.032 -0.374 -0.026
(0.094) (0.029) (0.339) (0.325) (0.026)
Ti*FriTreatedi (ρ) -0.238** 0.034 0.252 0.278 0.020
(0.098) (0.021) (0.252) (0.253) (0.020)
Control Mean 15.066 0.047 80.325 83.173 3.132
Control S.D. (4.689) (0.888) (10.408) (9.181) (0.741)
p-value: γ   ρ  0 0.380 0.126 0.314 0.715 0.737
Obs. 1527 3016 1527 1527 1527
Notes: Each column is an OLS regression. “Pre-lab” is the points (out of 19) received from the pre-lab assignments since Pre-E2 Message.
Column 2 stacks Exam 2 and 3 together as an independent variable. Column 3 to 5 use the aggregate course grade calculated according to
two formulas, as well as the final course grade (which should be the maximum of the two methods) as the outcome. All the standard errors
clustered at the lab section level and are shown in the brackets (68 clusters). The network is constructed based on the network elicited after
Exam 2, using the “or” definition. The individual controls included but not shown here are the same as before. Control mean is the mean
outcome for an untreated student with no treated study buddies. The p-value shown is under the null hypothesis that there are no peer effects
on the treated student.
are graded based on effort.36 Students can start doing the assignments earlier, manage their
time better, or put more effort into them. But for a test, more effort might not help. Table
1.4 shows that the treatment effects are larger on students with higher Exam 1 scores. For
these students with higher initial performance, the marginal return from doing additional online
practice questions might be low.
Another potential reason is that the increase in the applet usage crowds out the usage of
other materials. Although I do not have behavioral data on how students utilize different mate-
rials, students list what they have used for exam preparation in the post-exam surveys. In Table
1.8 column (1), I examine whether the treatment affects how many resources a student reports
to use for exam preparation. Treated students, on average, use slightly fewer materials than
the control students (β  0.724, p   0.001). The magnitude is small given that a student
generally uses 5 different materials for studying.37
Results in column (2) show that treated students are 13% less likely to claim to use the for-
36I say so because students can get credits if they list steps, even their answers are wrong.
37The five most popularly used materials, in a descending order, are lecture notes, formula cards, practice exam
questions, the applet and past required homework questions. These choices are consistent with what students plan
to use in the pre-exam messages.
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mula flash cards compared to control students. Since students can use the formula cards during
exams, one possible explanation is that treated students shift their time away from memoriz-
ing formulas, a seemingly less efficient activity.38 In fact, although about half of the students
wrote in their plan that they would use the formula cards for exam preparation, a third of them
claimed that they did not actually use the formula cards. This might indicate that students find
the formula cards less effective over time.
Column (3) uses students’ self-reported usage of the applet. The estimated γ and ρ are simi-
lar to the results from Table 1.3. However β is much smaller. Hence, although the self-reported
data suggests that students use fewer materials and might substitute away from using the for-
mula cards, these findings are not conclusive. It would be useful to measure the effectiveness
of the materials, to further support why students would substitute between the materials.
Table 1.8: Self-reported Exam Preparation
OLS (1) (2) (3)
#Materials Used Used Formula Card Used the Applet
Ti (β) -0.724*** -0.126*** 0.005
(0.194) (0.038) (0.037)
FriTreatedi (γ) 0.001 -0.001 0.023
(0.081) (0.015) (0.016)
Ti FriTreatedi (ρ) -0.076 0.007 -0.022*
(0.076) (0.015) (0.012)
Controls Y Y Y
Control Mean 5.32 0.627 0.463
Control S.D. 2.616 0.485 0.500
p-value: γ   ρ  0 0.305 0.617 0.892
Obs. 2969 2969 2969
Notes: All the standard errors clustered at the lab section level shown in the brackets (68 clusters). The network is constructed based on the
network elicited after Exam 2, using the “or” definition. The individual controls included but not shown here are gender, college cumulative
GPA until the semester starts, cohort dummies and high school GPA. Control mean is the mean outcome for an untreated student with no
treated study buddies. The p-value shown is under the null hypothesis that there are no peer effects on the treated student.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper uses a field experiment to causally estimate spillover effects on study behaviors
across self-selected peer groups in a large college statistics course. To overcome the challenge
for defining relevant peers, I collect detailed information to measure a social network of study
38Treated and control students self-report to spend a similar amount of time on studying. Hence the treatment
does not induce students to relax their time constraint.
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partners. I then randomly assign an educational intervention, based on insights from behavioral
economics, at the student level. Treated students receive advice on exam preparation and write
down study plans for upcoming exams. To identify causal spillover effects, I rely on exogenous
variations in students’ exposure to the treatment via study partners.
I examine how the study partner network affects student adoption of an educational tech-
nology. To overcome the difficulty in obtaining detailed and objective study behavior, I use
high-frequency applet usage data. Combining detailed network and usage data, I find that each
additional treated study partner increases one’s usage of the applet as well as how prepared
one is for the discussion sections. The estimated magnitude of the spillovers on an untreated
student is about 30% of the direct treatment effect.
To explore potential mechanisms, I present a simple social learning model where students
update beliefs about the return of the applet usage and then choose how much to use the applet
for better grades. Social learning increases belief precisions and expected utilities. My model
allows the level of social learning to vary with tie strength. Additional prediction of the model
is also corroborated by my empirical results. My findings imply that spillovers do not happen
just because of exposure to other treated individuals. Instead, an untreated student uses the
applet more when he/she is exposed to other treated individuals who also have a willingness
to use the applet. This highlights that policy makers, when facing constraints on how many to
treat, should target particular individuals to leverage social influence to scale up policy impacts.
Second, I find circumstances under which peer interactions mitigate the treatment effect. This
alerts policy makers to be careful about whom to treat even there is no constraints on how
many can be treated. A future extension of this paper is to structurally model spillover effects
in a social network for counter-factual policy experiments where I can change who receives the
treatment.
This study is among the first few to provide experimental evidence of how peer effects
generate spillover effects and induce behavioral changes in higher education, with a particular
focus on self-selected peers. The ability to measure study behaviors with better precision adds
to the few empirical studies exploring the mechanisms behind peer influence. From a policy
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perspective, my study shows that policy makers can leverage social interactions to spread in-




Peer Effects in Randomly Assigned Study Groups
2.1 Introduction
It is widely believed that peer interactions can have profound impacts on student academic out-
comes. Relying on random assignment into peer groups such as roommates and classmates,
past literature leverages the exogenous variations in peers’ characteristics to identify peer ef-
fects, circumventing biases due to selection into peer groups. Peer interactions in these groups
can be academic, social or both. Nonetheless, studies have not yet agreed on whether peers’
past academic performances affect students current academic performances.1 Understanding
how one can engineer peer groups can help teachers leverage peer effects to improve student
academic outcomes. The key goal of this paper is to provide direct and clean evidence of peer
effects on learning outcomes at the study group level, where student interactions are mostly
academically related.
To do that, I exploit a unique dataset in a naturally occurring environment with random
assignment of study groups. Students in my sample are college students from a large STEM
(Science, Technology, Engineer and Mathematics) field introductory course. Students sign up
1Sacerdote (2001) and Zimmerman (2003) find positive peer effects on college GPA between freshman room-
mates. Having a roommate with high baseline performance (measured by e.g. SAT/ACT scores) increases a
student’s first year GPA relative to otherwise. Furthermore, Ding and Lehrer (2007) further claim that reducing
the variation in baseline performance of one’s cohort mates increases one’s achievement outcomes. In contrast,
other studies using either randomly assigned roommates or seating neighbors find evidence for peer effects from
peers’ baseline performance (Foster, 2006; Han and Li, 2009; Zimmerman, 2003). Two other papers using regres-
sion discontinuity in admission scores also find little evidence of having high achieving peers affecting college
enrollment, graduation or quality (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2014; Dobbie and Fryer, 2014).
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for study groups and choose a preferred time slot. Within each time slot, there are several paral-
lel groups and students are assigned to those groups by a computer algorithm that I later argue
is plausibly random. Then I use exogenous variations in group members’ background char-
acteristics such as background academic performances and demographics to causally identify
peer effects on the course grade.
I find little evidence that peers’ background academic performances affect student course
grade, using both linear and nonlinear specifications of peer performance measures. The esti-
mated peer effects are in the expected directions but not statistically significant. This finding is
consistent with the results from Foster (2006) and Lu and Anderson (2015) but in contrast with
Sacerdote (2001) and Zimmerman (2003).2
Meanwhile, I provide evidence advocating for having more female students in the study
groups. I find a gender mix effect. Female students get higher course grades when they are
in a more female group, a finding consistent with Hoxby (2000) and Lu and Anderson (2015).
Moreover, I find that male students also benefit from studying with more females, a finding
in contrast with Hill (2015). Hill (2015) uses self-reported friendship data and a novel instru-
mental variable approach to conclude that the share of female school friends negatively affects
male students’ high school GPA. One key difference between his paper and mine is that I focus
primarily on academic interactions whereas he looks at potentially both academic and social
interactions. The contrasting findings suggest that peers may play a different role depending on
the nature of the interactions, which raises the necessity for future research to separately study
peer effects in academic versus social interactions.
A primary contribution of this paper is to shed light on possible mechanisms to explain
the gender mix effect. To do so, I gather detailed online course website usage data. The
log data show that being in a more female group makes one more likely to download exam
solutions and lecture handouts. This might happen due to peer influence or norm pressure
since female students tend to visit and download the materials more often than male students.
Regressions show a positive correlation between the course grade and how students download
these materials and thus a potential mechanism of peer effects through which the gender mix
2Foster (2006) also does not find such causal effects through friends’ background performance measures.
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affects the course grade is through changing particular study behavior.
As a secondary result, I provide evidence to advocate for mixing students based on their
lecture sections. Peers in different sections are exposed to different instructors and peers.
Therefore even when the course materials are standardized across the sections, study groups
may still act as a place for students to exchange and share information. I show that being in
a group with peers from different lecture sections increases one’s final course grade. Interest-
ingly, the relationship between how mixed a group is and the course grade is not linear. Having
peers from another lecture section is better than having none, but the benefit does not linearly
increase. Per the estimates, the optimal number of peers from a different section is around 9
for an average size group with 12 students.
This paper advances the previous literature on peer effects in the following way. First, previ-
ous literature suffers from justifying the definitions of peer groups. For example, Stinebrickner
and Stinebrickner (2006) doubt whether one should use freshmen roommates, who are merely
randomly assigned to live together, to look for evidence of peer effects on academic outcomes.
This study defines peer groups in a collaborative learning environment that has not been studied
before. Second, this paper focuses on peer effects in academic interactions while previous stud-
ies have mixed both academic and social interactions together. Lastly, earlier literature except
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2006) does not offer clear insights into how peer effects op-
erate. They attribute peer effects to some unobservable peer quality that can manifest through
past academic performances. I unpack a possible mechanism of peer effects which is that peers
can change particular study behavior. With more readily available data measuring how students
study (through online course platforms and learning technologies), researchers can acquire de-
tailed behavioral data to better understand how peer effects operate. On a practical level, my
paper provides practical suggestions for assigning students into study groups.3
3Peer groups or cooperative learning are popular teaching tools. In a national survey (Puma et al., 1993), 79%
of elementary school teachers and 62% of middle school teachers reported that they asked students to form study
groups and assist each other’s learning process.
43
2.2 Study Group Administration
In this section, I go over the institutional background and the set up of the study groups. The
Science Learning Center (SLC) at the University of Michigan organizes study groups for a vari-
ety of STEM courses each semester.4 The study groups work in the following way. Each study
group meets roughly once a week for two hours.5 During these meetings, each group reviews
course materials, solves problems, and discusses concepts together with a peer facilitator who
has completed the course in previous semesters. The meetings are designed to engage all group
members, and are not meant to be tutoring or review sessions led solely by the group facili-
tator. The facilitators’ job includes administration (such as taking attendance and contacting
absent group members) and supporting members to teach and learn from each other. The facil-
itators are screened for qualifications and all have standardized formal training before working
as facilitators. They are paid for the time preparing for and being in the study group meetings.
The facilitators are randomly assigned to groups based on their time schedule. Students do not
know who the facilitators are until the first study group meeting.
Students sign up for a study group by choosing a preferred time slot via the SLC website.
See Figure 2.1 for a user interface of the registration website. Within each slot, there are usually
several seemingly identical groups. They only differ from each other by having different group
numbers attached. For example, if a time slot has two groups, then one is labeled as “xxx-001”
and the other is labeled as “xxx-002”. These two group labels are almost identical except the
group number. There is no information revealed to the students about who have signed up, who
the peer facilitator is or where the study groups meet.6 When a student clicks to join a group,
the system assigns him/her to the smallest group of that time slot. In other words, a student
can end up in a different group from his/her group of choice. The system processes students’
signing up requests in batches. About every other two minutes, the system processes all the
requests received in the past two minutes. This design adds noise to the information students
4These courses are Bio 171, 172 and Chem 130, 210, 215. SLC is the only official university office that holds
study groups for these courses on campus.
5They usually meet once a week and a couple of extra times for exams. The facilitators sometime move the
meeting time for special events such as religious holidays and fall break. A typical study group meets for 15-17
times a semester.
6Most of the groups meet on central campus.
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Figure 2.1: Signing up for a Study Group Online
see, because a group that is open when a student signs up may no longer be open when the
system processes his/her request. Students do not know the system’s algorithm at all. Hence
this serves as a natural experiment where students are randomly to study groups given their
time slot choices. Another feature that makes the assignment random is that the study group
time slots are filled up very quickly within a couple of hours after the registration process is
open. Students have little time to coordinate with their friends’ schedules and preferences in
order to pick a specific group to join together.7
All the groups start with about 12 assigned students. If no groups in a student’s desired time
slot are open, he/she can choose to be on the wait-list for that time slot or choose another time
slot. If the SLC staffs see excessive demand for particular time slots (such as a long waiting list
or emails from students asking for additional groups), they increase the size limit for the study
groups within those time slots. Students register for popular time slots therefore will have more
peers in their groups. In my regressions, I control for time fixed effects.
Attendance is voluntary. Facilitators have the right to drop students from the study group
7In a typical system, the SLC has over thousands of students signing up for peer study groups but only six
full time staffs. This system algorithm is the best randomization process given the administrative constraints. In
later years, the SLC uses some non-random grouping mechanism such as having students in special education
programs to be in the same group.
45
if they miss more than two meetings without excuses. Once a student is dropped, a slot opens
up and wait-listed students have priority to join the group. Students who want to switch groups
need to go through the SLC website to drop themselves from the current groups and sign up for
another one. This rule is strictly enforced.8 The facilitators cannot manually add in students.
The SLC staffs do not handle students’ email request to switch groups. Although switching
groups may lead to sorting in study groups, I show in section 2.3.4 that this is not a concern.
2.3 Basic Data Description
2.3.1 Sample and Key Variables
My sample consists of undergraduate students taking Chemistry 210 (Chem 210, Introduction
to Organic Chemistry) during the Fall 2013 semester. Chem 210 is the first course to introduce
students to organic chemistry. It is one of the largest undergraduate STEM gatekeeper courses
for the science majors in the College of Literature, Science and Art. Students from this course
have always had a high demand for study groups. Each semester, on average more than half of
the course takers participate in a Chem 210 study group organized by the SLC. This participa-
tion rate is much higher than that of other courses for which the SLC provides the study group
program.9
In my analysis, I only include study group participants who attend at least two meetings
over the whole semester. See Appendix B for the full distribution of attendance. Those who are
assigned to groups but rarely show up are unlikely to cast a significant amount of peer effects
on others or be influenced by peers. 61 students (about 7%) of the students who initially sign up
for a study group successfully are dropped because of this.10 Six students switched to another
group after attending a couple of sessions in one group. For these six students, I treat the same
student in different groups as two different students.11
The SLC provides detailed group and facilitator assignment, weekly attendance (including
8In only one special case, a student attends two different study groups throughout the semester.
9Those courses have a participation rate around 25%.
10I check to make sure that the student characteristics that I use in the analysis are not predictors for a student
being dropped by me.
11The choice of dropping data and the choice of treating the six students appearing in different observations do
not affect my main results.
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excused absence) and study group weekly agenda recorded by the facilitators. The university
registrar provides detailed information on all students enrolled in Chem 210 during the fall
2013 semester. The information includes gender, ethnicity, residency, high school GPA, SAT
and ACT scores in each subject, class standing, credit units taken, academic level, cumulative
GPA, special education program affiliation and Chem 210 course grade.12 Two students from
the SLC data set are not found in the registrar data set.13
For ACT and SAT scores, I convert them into percentile scores to measure past academic
performance. I use the SAT percentile scores only when the ACT scores are missing.14 I use the
math test scores to approximate past math performance. To quantify past English performance
I can either use the ACT English percentile score or the ACT reading percentile score. In most
of the results shown below, using these two different English performance measures yields very
similar results. For succinctness, I only present results using the ACT English percentile scores.
When the ACT percentile scores are missing, I use the SAT verbal percentile scores. For the
outcome measure, I use the course GPA by converting the letter grade using the University’s
conversion rubric.15
2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics by Study Group Participation
Since students decide whether to sign up for the study group program, I first compare the char-
acteristics of students who are in the study groups to those who are not, in order to understand
how different the study group participants are from those who do not participate.
Table 2.1 compares the background characteristics such as gender, being an in state student,
past academic performances, course completion rate and grades by study group participation.
Of all the 1437 students enrolled in Chem 210, 830 students participate in a study group at
least three times a semester and I classify them as study group participants. Comparing the
12The special education program is called the Comprehensive Studies Program (CSP). According to the official
CSP website description - “many CSP students are the first in their family to go to college, come from populations
historically underrepresented at the University, or attended under-resourced high schools”.
13It is possible that these two students are not officially registered for the class. SLC does not require students
to be enrolled in courses to participate in the study groups.
149 students have neither scores in the registrar data.
15Please refer to http://www.lsa.umich.edu/students/academicsrequirements/lsadegreesrequirements/ credit-
sandgradepointaverage.
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Table 2.1: Individual Characteristics
Study Group = 0 Study Group = 1 (Study Group = 1)-
(Study Group = 0)
Mean N Mean N Mean
(Std.) (Std.) (S.E.)
Female 0.384 607 0.577 830 0.193***
(0.486) (0.494) (0.02)
In State (MI) 0.702 607 0.666 830 -0.036
(0.458) (0.472) (0.025)
High School GPA 3.860 551 3.866 786 0.007
(0.166) (0.146) (0.009)
Math Performance 93.323 588 91.776 821 -1.547***
(8.833) (10.138) (0.508)
Eng. Performance 90.850 588 89.801 821 -1.049*
(10.907) (11.291) (0.291)
Withdraw 0.089 607 0.034 830 -0.055***
(0.285) (0.181) (0.013)
Course Grade 2.716 553 2.908 802 0.191***
(1.061) (0.884) (0.0549)
Notes: Math Performance equals one’s ACT math percentile score (or SAT math per-
centile score if ACT scores are missing). Eng. Performance equals one’s ACT English
percentile score (or SAT verbal percentile scores if ACT scores are missing). The
standard deviations of the variables and the standard errors for the t-tests are shown
in brackets. The null hypothesis for the t-test is that the two sample means are not
statistically different, assuming equal variances.    10%,    5%,    1%.
participants and the non-participants, I see more female students (diff.  0.193, p   0.01) and
students with slightly worse past math (diff.  1.547, p   0.01) and English performances
(diff.  1.049, p   0.1) select into study groups.
The study group participants nonetheless are less likely to withdraw from the course (diff. 
0.055, p   0.01) and end up getting higher final course grade (diff.  0.191, p   0.01)
than the non-participants, despite the fact that students with slightly worse math or English
preparations select into the study groups at the beginning. The distribution of the final course
grades also differ between the participants and the non-participants. Figure 2.2 shows that the
participants are less likely to have extremely low grades. This might suggest the effectiveness
of the study groups since past academic preparations are expected to positively predict the
course grade. Table B.1 presents various regression estimates for the relationship between
study group participation and the course final grade. Column (3) and (4) fail to reject that the
grade difference between study group participants and non participants is the same for males
and females.
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Figure 2.2: Course Grade (GPA) Distribution
It is noted that the sample that select into the study groups are quite different from the rest
along several dimensions.
2.3.3 Peer Group Descriptive Statistics
The study groups on average have 12 students with a maximum size of 15 and a minimum size
of 9. Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics of three key academic background characteristics
for the peers in a total of 69 study groups.
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Percentile
Obs. Mean SD Min 25th 50th 75th Max
Group Size 69 12 1.5 9 11 13 13 15
Avg. Peer High School GPA 791 3.87 0.05 3.72 3.84 3.87 3.90 3.98
Avg. Peer Math Performance 826 91.75 2.94 83.82 89.92 92.18 93.89 97.00
Avg. Peer Eng. Performance 826 86.80 3.83 79.45 87.87 90.15 91.83 97.18
Notes: The total number of study group participants is 836.
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Table 2.3: Endogeneity Checks
Own X =
High School GPA Math Performance Eng. Performance
Avg. X of -0.020 0.001 -0.007
Own Group Peers (0.083) (0.043) (0.072)
Avg. X of Peers -38.86*** -43.07*** -40.26***
from Concurrent Groups (4.765) (3.354) (3.855)
Study Group Time Slot Fixed Effect Y Y Y
R2 0.81 0.85 0.82
N 791 826 826
Notes: Each column is a separate regression. The dependent variable is one’s own prior academic perfor-
mance measure. “Avg. X of Group Peers” is the mean of the group peers (excluding oneself). “Avg. X of
Peers from Concurrent Groups” is the mean of everyone from study groups that are in the same time slot.
Standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the study group level, resulting in 69 clusters.
2.3.4 Endogeneity Checks
Before turning into examining peer effects, I first check for the exogeneity of the group assign-
ment within each time slot. That is, I test whether there is a statistically significant relationship
between one’s own background characteristics and those of the group members.
I use a modified test first used by Guryan et al. (2009) to avoid the mechanical negative
biases when one follows previous studies (e.g. Sacerdote (2001) and Foster (2006)) to check
for exogeneity. For each background characteristic, I regress one’s own on the average of that
of the peers in one’s own study group and the average of that of students from concurrent study
groups.16 If the study group assignment is not random, then the coefficients on peers’ past
academic performances should be statistically different from zero.
The results from the modified test are shown in Table 2.3. The standard errors are clustered
at the study group level. The correlations between all of these three measures are small in mag-
nitude and statistically insignificant (βHigh School GPA  0.020, βMath Performance  0.001, βEng. Performance 
0.007, p ¡ 0.1). Hence, I cannot reject that students are randomly assigned into study groups
within a time slot.
16If I were to use the tests in Sacerdote (2001) and Foster (2006), I would not include the average background
characteristics of students from concurrent study groups as an independent variable. For a discussion on why the
modified test is preferred to the typical test, please see Guryan et al. (2009).
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2.4 Results
Since there is no evidence suggesting that the students are assigned nonrandomly I now ex-
amine how peers’ background academic performances affect one’s own course grade. In this
section, I first examine peer effects using a typical linear in the mean model. I then run alter-
native regressions where I use different statistics of peer characteristics to test for other peer
effect models in the literature.
2.4.1 Effects of Peers’ Background Abilities
I first use a simple model where one’s course grade is linear in one’s own and peers’ past
academic performance measures. Specifically, for a student ‘i’ from study group Gi:
yi  α   βPi   γPi,Gi   ηXi   δTGi   εi (2.1)
where yi is i’s course grade. Pi includes own past academic performance measures (math and
English ACT/SAT test scores and high school GPA). Pi,Gi includes group peers’ average aca-
demic performances (excluding oneself). ε is the conditional mean-zero error term. TGi is the
study group meeting time dummy. β measures the effects of own past academic performances
on the course grade, while γ measures the effects of the average performances of the peer group.
γ is the key peer effect estimate of interest. The ratio, γ
β
, equals to the relative effect of an in-
crease in peers’ past performance compared to one’s own. Note that with measurement errors,
both α and β are subject to attenuation biases. When there is an equal amount of measurement
error in both Pi and Pi,Gi ,
γ
β
is a measurement-error-corrected estimate of the relative effect.
Column (1)-(4) in Table 2.4 use the average peer past performance measures as the inde-
pendent variables. Column (4) jointly estimates the effects of all peer past performances. As
one would expect, the coefficients on own past performance are always positive and strongly
statistically significant. The magnitude of these coefficients are not subtle. One standard de-
viation increase in one’s own math performance measure leads to more than 0.3 GPA (more
than a whole grade tier) increase. The effect of past English performance is much smaller in
comparison.
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The estimated effects of peers’ past performances (γ) are not statistically significant. The
magnitudes of the peer effect estimates are about a third of the effects from one’s own past
performances. Using the median statistics of peers’ past performance in column (5)-(8), I also
do not find significant peer effects.17 These results show that peers’ background academic
performances have little impact on the course grade, even in a context where interactions are
primarily academic. Such a conclusion highlights that studying with, on average, peers of
“high performances” measured by past test scores is not necessarily effective at increasing
course performance.
The above regressions assume that it is peers’ average performances that affect course
grades. Now I relax this assumption and turn to examine alternative peer effect models taken
from Hoxby and Weingarth (2005). These models hypothesize different forms of peer effect
structures. The Shining Light model claims that the maximum past peer performances have
a positive effect on one’s achievement. The Bad Apple model claims that the minimum past
peer performances negatively affect achievement outcomes. The Focus model claims that peer
homogeneity improves academic outcomes. Having some peers with high performances and
some with low performances is better than only having peers of high performances.18
In order to check these models, I replace Pi,Gi with alternative measures corresponding to
these three models. To test for the Shining Light model, column (1) in Table 2.5 replicates the
same regression in Table 2.4 but uses the maximum peer performances as Pi,Gi . The point
estimates of own performance measures are largely unchanged to compared to those in Table
2.4. However, having peers with higher math performances has a negative and significant im-
pact on the course grade. A one standard deviation increase in the maximum math ACT/SAT
score of the peers is associated with about a 0.5 grade GPA (half a standard deviation) decrease.
This finding is against the Shining Light model. Foster (2006) and Guryan et al. (2009) also
find a similar negative effect, although their estimates are smaller than mine. Column (2) tests
the Bad Apple model. I then use the minimum peer performances to test whether the lowest
peer background performance measures matter. The estimates in front of the peer measures
17When I run column (4) and (8) specifications separately for female and male students, I still do not find
evidence for peer effects.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.5: Results with Alternative Measures of Peers’
Background Performances
(1) (2) (3)
Measure of Peers’ Performance
Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
High School GPA -3.129* -0.109 0.711
(Peers’) (1.623) (0.156) (0.263)
Math Performance -0.162*** 0.003 -0.011*
(Peers’) (0.054) (0.002) (0.006)
Eng. Performance -0.052 -0.002 0.009
(Peers’) (0.032) (0.001) (0.006)
High School GPA 1.544*** 1.567*** 1.560***
(0.235) (0.235) (0.233)
Math Performance 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Eng. Performance 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Control Y Y Y
Time Slot Fixed Effect Y Y Y
R2 0.33 0.32 0.32
N 808 808 808
Notes: This is an OLS specification. Standard errors are shown
in brackets. Control variables are the same as in the previous ta-
ble. The standard errors are clustered at the study group level (69
clusters) and are shown in the brackets.
are small and statistically insignificant. To test the Focus model, I calculate the standard devi-
ations of pees’ performances. Column (3) shows weak evidence that a bigger spread in peers’
math performance leads to a decrease in grades and the estimates are marginally statistically
significant (β  0.011, p   0.1). Hence, there is also no supporting evidence for the Focus
Model.
2.4.2 Effects from Peers’ Non-performance Measures
In the previous section, I find little evidence for peer effects through background performances.
Other dimensions of group composition can also play a crucial role. In this section, I explore
other channels of peer effects relying on the variations in the non-performance measures.
These non-performance measures include the gender mix of the group, as well as the aca-
demic diversity of the group measured by the mix of different lecture sections. Previous find-
ings show that being surrounded by female classmates positively impacts learning (Hoxby,
2000; Lu and Anderson, 2015). Gender composition is a topic that has received wide attention
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in classroom and school organization. I examine the gender mix effect in an environment with
direct academic interactions amongst the peers.
Since the course is a gatekeeper course and has multiple lecturers, students from different
lecture sections might be exposed to different contents or different ways to understand the
concepts even the contents are the same. Therefore one might benefit from studying with others
from other sections by exchanging course related information. Therefore I will also examine
the effect of mixing students by lecture section on the course grade.
In Figure 2.3, a student’s course grade is plotted against the number of female peers and the
number of peers from other lecture sections. In both Figure 2.3 (a) and (b), the non-performance
measures are positively correlated with the course grade.
To quantify the effect size, I run the following specification,
yi  α   βPi   γZi   ηXi   δTGi   εi (2.2)
where Zi measures the group mixture based on gender and lecture sections.
I use # Female Peers as an independent variable in column (1) of Table 2.6. The point
estimate of 0.031 implies that a standard deviation in crease in the number of female peers,
holding the group size constant, leads to about a 0.01 standard deviation increase in the course
grade. In column (2), I use # OtherLec Peers as an independent variable. This variable equals
to the number of group members from a different lecture section. The point estimate is a third
of the effect of # Female Peers but it is not precisely estimated. In column (3) I include the
square term to capture the nonlinear relationship.19 Interestingly, the relationship between the
lecture section mix and the course grade is not linear. Having peers from another lecture section
is better than having none, but the benefit does not linearly increase. The results show that the
optimal number of # OtherLec Peers is around 9 ( 0.116
20.008
) for a group an average size of 12
students. In the last column, I combine the two measures and the results are largely unchanged.
19The second order term for # Female Peers has a small and statistically insignificant estimate, and is therefore
not included in the regressions.
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(a) By Gender Mix
(b) By Lecture Section Mix
Figure 2.3: Peers’ Non-performance Measures on Grades
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Table 2.6: Peer Effects: From Non-performance Measures
DV: Course Grade (1) (2) (3) (4)
# Female Peers 0.031** 0.029**
(0.013) (0.012)
# OtherLec Peers 0.012 0.116* 0.109*
(0.018) (0.064) (0.062)
# OtherLec Peers2 -0.008* -0.007*
(0.004) (0.004)
High School GPA 1.591*** 1.581*** 1.598*** 1.613***
(0.233) (0.236) (0.235) (0.236)
Math Performance 0.027*** 0.0275*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Eng. Performance 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Female -0.274*** -0.276*** -0.279*** -0.276***
(0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Controls Y Y Y Y
R2 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.33
N 808 808 808 808
Notes: This is an OLS specification. Standard errors are shown in brackets.
Standard errors are shown in brackets. Control variables include those from
the previous table, plus group size. # Female Peers is the number of female
group peers, with a mean of 6.6 and a standard deviation of 2. # OtherLec
Peers is the number of group members taught by a different lecturer, with a
mean of 6.5 and a standard deviation of 2.5.
I further cut the sample by gender and do not find that these effects differ by gender.20
My findings support the policies to further increase the female presence in particularly these
introductory STEM classes as both female and male students benefit from being surrounded
with other female students. In addition, the results suggest that is an optimal way to mix
students based on their lecture sections.
2.5 Mechanisms
Previous literature finding that student are affected by the number of female in one’s environ-
ment do not offer concrete evidence to explain potential mechanisms. In this section, I explore
mechanisms to explain why a student is better off when there are more female in the study
group. One potential mechanism is that female students study in a different way from male stu-
dents and the differences in study habits lead to differences in learning. Psychologists recently
20Results not shown but available from the author upon requests.
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find that female students are more self-disciplined (Duckworth and Seligman, 2005) and being
self-disciplined positively predicts student course performances after controlling for cognitive
measures such as IQ (Almlund et al., 2011; Duckworth and Seligman, 2006).
Motivated by the psychology literature, I explore the usage of course website, especially
how students access the course materials online.21 Such behavior might be affected by personal
traits as self-disciplined students are more likely to view in a browser tab or download these
materials for learning purposes. I first categorize the online documents posted before the final
exam (a total of 17) into the following five categories: general documents on learning guidance
(a total of 4), practice questions (a total of 4), exam keys (a total of 3), topic handouts (a total of
3) and grading policies (a total of 3).22 Because the grading policies should not affect students’
efforts to achieve grades, I focus my analysis only on the downloads of the first four categories
(a total of 14 materials). I ask whether being in more female group makes one more likely to
assess these materials as well and whether more assess leads to a higher grade grade.
Table 2.7 Panel A is based on the following estimation equation to test the effect of assessing
materials on the course grade:
Gradei  α   β  Pi   γ  usagei   ηXi   εi (2.3)
For each category of materials, I set usagei to one if one has accessed all the materials of
that category. I also have an overall measure of usagei which equals to one when one has
downloaded all the 14 files. Pi and Xi control for individual academic performances and de-
mographics. γ is expected to be positive and significant.
Panel B of the same table tests for the correlation between the group gender mix and the
downloading behavior:
usagei  α   β  Pi   γ  t#Female Peersiu   ηXi   εi (2.4)
γ is expected to be positive and significant.
21Due to data limitation, I cannot observe how students utilize the materials.
22For a detailed list of all the materials, please see the Appendix.
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Table 2.7: Course Website Usage as a Mechanism
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DV: Grade All General Docs Practice Q Exam Keys Handouts
Usage 0.162 0.021 0.127** 0.130** 0.126**
(0.120) (0.079) (0.060) (0.063) (0.059)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
N 808 808 808 808 808
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DV: Usage All General Docs Practice Q Exam Keys Handouts
# Female Peers 0.012** 0.007 0.006 0.024** 0.021**
(0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
N 808 808 808 808 808
Notes: Controls include past high school gpa, math and English performances, plus
dummies for study group meeting time dummies. Standard error adjusted for 69 clusters
at the study group level.
The estimates in Table 2.7 Panel A show that the action ofdownloading exam keys and topic
handouts is positively correlated with the course grade. A student who has downloaded all the
exam keys on average gain a 0.127 course GPA increase than a student who does not do so.
The magnitude of the estimates in Column (4) and (5) is very similar. Panel B suggests that
the number female peers in groups positively impacts downloading exam keys and handouts.
Taking these two observations together, I conclude that female group members help a student
learn better making him/her more likely to download course materials which are helpful for
getting a higher course grade.
2.6 Conclusion
It is well known that peers are an important factor in learning. Study groups are popular teach-
ing tools but very few have studied how study group composition affects student academic
outcomes. This paper closes this gap and provides direct and clean evidence of peer effects on
learning outcomes at the study group level. I exploit a unique dataset from a natural experi-
ment. The Science Learning Center at the University of Michigan organizes study groups for
main STEM field introductory classes and the sign up process creates an exogenous variation
in peer group composition.
Although students with slightly worse past academic performances chose to join the study
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groups, their average course grade is almost a letter grade higher than those who did not partic-
ipate. After presenting evidence that the study group assignment is plausibly exogenous, I test
various peer effect models.
I find little evidence that peers’ background academic performance measures have effects
on learning outcomes using the linear in the mean model. Non-linear models such as the
Bad Apple, Shining Light, and Focus Model. Consistent with previous studies, I find that
gender mix has an economically and statistically significant impact on learning. Specifically,
an increase in the number of female peers leads to an increase in the course GPA. I also find
that studying with peers from another lecture section improves one’s course grade and there is
an optimal mixture.
More importantly, I show evidence for a potential mechanism underlying peer effect in
study groups. I show that the gender mix can affect the course grade through changing how
students study.
My results overall suggest that educators should assign students into groups based on par-
ticular background characteristics such as gender instead of SAT/ACT test scores. Also, mixing
students from different sections may foster knowledge sharing and thus promotes better learn-
ing outcomes.
One future extension of this work is to gather intermediate learning outcome measures such
as homework scores in order to unpack how peers affect the learning process.
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Chapter 3
Laboratory on the Social Network: Homophily and
Peer Influence for Economic Preferences
with Erin L. Krupka and Steve Leider
3.1 Introduction
Ample cross-sectional data find that the behaviors of individuals in one’s social network are
positively correlated with one’s own behavior. This correlation is observed for behaviors
such as academic performance (Burke and Sass, 2013; Calvo-Armengo et al., 2009; Sacerdote,
2001), technology uptake (Conley and Udry, 2010), health outcomes (Christakis and Fowler,
2007, 2009; Stevens and Prinstein, 2005), labor market participation (Calvo-Armengol and
Jackson, 2004; Topa, 2001), crime participation (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999), new product
diffusion (Aral and Walker, 2011a,b), and the exchange of goods and information (Bramoullé
et al., 2009; Granovetter, 1985). Another stream of cross-sectional studies has focused on be-
havior and diagnostic tasks that are more closely tied to fundamental economic preferences.
These papers find suggestive evidence that preferences are also correlated within a social net-
work.1
However, these cross-sectional studies have only looked at correlations at a particular point
1Dohmen et al. (2012) find that an individual’s risk preference and levels of trust are positively correlated both
with their parents’ preferences, and with the average preferences of their region. Bettinger and Slonim (2006) and
Bettinger and Slonim (2007), by contrast, find no correlation between the altruism or patience of a parent and a
child.
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in time, and are not able to speak to why and how such correlations evolve. The detection
and measurement of network effects that produce the observed correlations in behavior and
preference correlations in individual’s network is a difficult exercise but a critical one for un-
derstanding how institutions and social contexts shape behavior (Fehr et al., 2013; Fehr and
Hoff, 2011; Frank et al., 2013). This correlation can occur because we tend to select friends
because they are similar to us (referred to as “homophily”), or because we become more similar
to our friends over time (referred to as “influence”).2 Distinguishing influence from homophily
(while eliminating confounds) requires dynamic, longitudinal network information about the
emergence of ties between people in a network and also separate measures of behaviors, aspi-
rations and preferences of the individuals in the network (i.e., repeated measures on preference
constructs, on behaviors such as academic course selection or study group attendance and on
attitudes such as aspirations as major or graduate). Ahern et al. (2014) look at how the average
preferences in an MBA student’s randomly assigned class section affects an individual’s own
preferences relative to their initial preferences before enrollment. The authors find a positive
peer effect for risk attitudes, and a negative peer effect of altruism. By using the pre- and post-
enrollment measures of preferences, the authors are able to provide causal evidence for peer
influence on preferences. But they cannot look at both homophily and influence at the same
time. In this paper, we use a longitudinal survey design to track both homophily and influence
over time.
Another feature in most of the cross-sectional studies is that they construct social networks
based on random peer group assignment (e.g. random assignment into lecture sections in Ahern
et al. (2014)) or geographic proximity (e.g. regions of residence in Dohmen et al. (2012))
to identify the influence of the social and institutional environment on preferences. Random
assignment into peer groups eliminates the confound that arises when individuals can pick who
is in or out of their network. However, earlier work in psychology and sociology suggests that
individuals with whom one associates or with whom one shares a similar identity are more
influential (Cialdini and Garde, 1987; Granovetter, 1985; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Networks
2Quite many papers show evidence for homophily (Currarini et al., 2010; Fisher and Bauman, 1988; Kandel,
1978; Mayer and Puller, 2008; McPherson et al., 2001). Another well-established stream of literature shows
evidence for influence (Bauman and Ennett, 1996; Fehr and Hoff, 2011; Meyer and Waller, 2001; Oster and
Thornton, 2012). Very few examine these two processes at the same time.
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based on geographic proximity may not be a relevant transmission channel for social influence.
We directly elicit a student’s social network to define relevant peers to circumvent these issues.
We test for the effects of friend behavior on social network formation as well as behav-
ior and economic preference change in the context of newly arriving undergraduate students.3
The preferences we focus on are time, risk and altruism. Understanding individual decision-
making under risk and over time, as well as an individual’s inclination to exhibit generosity
toward others, are three foundations of economic analysis and are correlated with important
life decisions.4 These preferences also influence many academic outcomes. For example, risk
preferences describe an individual’s willingness to accept more or less risky choices and are
correlated with decisions such as whether to enter competitive environments such as high stakes
testing or entrance exams to competitive schools (Ors et al., 2013). Time preferences charac-
terize how an individual is willing to trade off amongst costs and benefits that occur at different
times and have been shown to predict cumulative GPA of college graduates and whether or not
they complete college within four years (Burks et al., 2015). Altruism preferences describe
a person’s concern for the welfare of others and are correlated with college students’ willing-
ness to donate to a charitable fund offering low interest loans to financially challenged students
(Benz and Meier, 2008).
We focus on testing the effect of social networks on risk, time and generosity preferences as
well as testing the dynamics of adding and dropping friendship ties. To do this we create a labo-
ratory on the social network in which we measure the emerging social network of 399 incoming
freshman at the University of Michigan. Our data collection strategy consists of (1) recruiting
voluntary participants, (2) mapping students’ social network intensely in their first year and
(3) using surveys and economic experiments to measure key variables of interest during the
3We use the freshman cohort as our sample because when college students arrive on campus for the first time,
they are also arriving to a whole new social environment from which they will build new friendship, mentoring,
studying, and employment networks. During their first year away from home, they will develop new work and
personal habits and they will make choices about college courses and majors that will impact them for years to
come. The newly formed social networks, and associated social capital (Coleman, 1988), can have profound
effects on their experiences at college - from which major they choose to where they get a job on campus, to
whether they experience mental health issues during their college years.
4Social preferences have been linked to macro economic phenomena such as cross county variation in Gross
Domestic Product, and poverty disparities (Karlan et al., 2009; Knack and Keefer, 1997). Risk preferences have
been correlated with investment, retirement health related behavior and career choices, and time preferences have
been linked to smoking, obesity, educational and savings behavior (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008).
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course of their first year. Unlike other studies that provided only cross-sectional evidence, or
looked only at one mechanism (influence or homophily), our design allows us to observe and
distinguish between two mechanisms for correlated behavior on a network: network dynam-
ics and peer influences. Additionally, we can provide direct evidence for homophily based on
behavioral measures of economic preferences (rather than behaviors correlated with economic
preferences), and evidence for influence of social peers on preferences (rather than an influence
of family members such as parents on preferences).
To measure students’ social networks we use an incentivized elicitation method taken from
Leider et al. (2009). In each of three phases (October, January and April), participating students
are asked to name ten other freshman as friends. Students receive a monetary lottery payment
for each named student that names them back. For each phase, after the friendship elicitation
stage, subjects are invited to also complete an incentivized preference elicitation survey. Be-
cause we want to have a measure of fundamental economics preferences, we use diagnostic
tasks that are closely tied to our preferences of interest (risk tolerance, patience and altruism).
We use multiple price lists between safe and risky outcomes to measure risk attitudes, multiple
price lists between sooner and distant payments to measure patience, and dictator allocation
decisions to measure altruism. We also ask subjects to self-report their tolerance for risk and
their patience. Using this data we can ask two broad sets of questions: (1) are changes in a
student’s network (e.g. adding or dropping a friendship link) between phases driven by the
similarity between the two students on some economic preference? (2) Are a students eco-
nomic preferences influenced by the corresponding preferences of the students current and/or
past social ties?
We find in the affirmative for both questions. First, we find that an individual is significantly
more likely to add a friendship tie with another student, and significantly less likely to drop an
existing friendship tie, if that student has similar level of generosity to the focal student. The
magnitude of homophily is substantial a one standard deviation increase in similarity changes
the likelihood of adding or dropping by an amount equal to 20-50% of the base rate. It is also
large compared to other factors that one would expect might drive network changes a one
standard deviation change in altruism similarity has an effect half as large as participating in
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the same activity, and is about 2.5 times as large as a one standard deviation increase in the
network centrality of the other student.
Additionally, we find evidence for peer influence on risk preferences, as well as some evi-
dence for peer influence on time preferences. We find that an individual’s self-reported toler-
ance for risk is significantly correlated with the average rating for both the individual’s friends,
and their broader network community. The correlation is also robust to looking at both the aver-
age behavior of others in the same phase as well as the lagged behavior from previous phases.
A one standard deviation increase in the average choices of an individual’s friends or social
community is associated with an increase of 1/8th to 1/10th of a standard deviation for that
individual. Similarly, we find that an individual’s incentivized patience choices are correlated
with their friends and community. A one standard deviation increase in friends’ or commu-
nity’s patience increases the patience of the focal individual by 1/7th to 1/12th of a standard
deviation. The results for risk preferences, but not time preferences, are robust to the inclusion
of lagged dependent variables, although with our short panel (and the incomplete participation
of some subjects) this substantially reduces our sample size.
We additionally find robust evidence for a negative peer influence effect on generosity. That
is, individuals become significantly less generous when they have friends or a social community
that are particularly altruistic. This result is consistent with free-riding behavior, and aligns
with recent evidence from a related study by Ahern et al. (2014) on peer influence among
MBA students.
Our contribution is to provide evidence for two separate mechanisms (homophily and in-
fluence) that can be the source of the often observed contemporaneous correlation between an
individual’s behavior or preferences and their social network’s behavior and social preferences.
Additionally, we demonstrate these effects for the subtle (but broadly important) underlying
economic preferences, rather than the observable but potentially domain-specific behaviors
previously studied. Further this work advances both the understanding of how a student’s so-
cial network and preferences evolve upon entering college, and how a student’s social network
affects one’s economic preferences.
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Figure 3.1: Research Structure and Data Collection Timeline
3.2 Research Design
Figure 1 shows an overview of the experimental timeframe. Our target population were the
incoming freshman at the University of Michigan. To this end, we needed to create our own
freshman subject pool from which to recruit subjects into our experiment. Thus, in Phase 0
we recruited freshman using (the traditional method of) flyers and we also developed a Face-
book application. We created the Facebook application as both a method of gathering general
personal data (including friend lists) and a recruitment tool for the next phases of the research.
All students who were eligible to participate had to provide a valid university email address
when enabling the application; this allowed us to verify that they were in fact incoming Uni-
versity of Michigan freshman (this was crossed checked with a database of freshman email
addresses which we obtained in cooperation with the Registrar).5 We concluded recruiting by
late September of 2013; all subjects who had consented during the month of September were
eligible for receiving emails which invited them to participate in our online experiments in
Phase 1 to 3.
Having concluded recruiting, we moved on to Network Mapping stage of Phase 1. Con-
sented freshman were contacted via email and invited to participate in an online survey. Sub-
jects were told that the online study would consist of two parts and that they would be paid for
5We designed the Facebook application to pilot a mechanism for reaching and identifying densely connected
subsets of students. However, for this study we ended up using everyone who agreed to participate.
66
their participation after completing both parts. In part one we mapped subjects’ social network.
Subjects were sent a link to part one and told that they could complete part one (and subse-
quently part two) within a 3 day window. However, once they opened the link to part one, they
would be required to finish part one before receiving a separate link to part two. They were
told that they had 30 minutes to complete part one, once they had moved to the next screen
they would not be able to return to the previous question to change their answers and that they
would not able to come back to Part 1 of the study once they logged out of Part 1 or once the
30 minutes are up.6
To elicit the network we used a protocol developed by Leider et al. (2009).7 The protocol
asks a participant to list their 10 best friends on campus and pays subjects a bonus for any friend
who also participated and listed them as well. If the subject listed a friend who also completed
the survey and listed her as well, she received a 50 percent chance of getting a prize of $0.50.
Otherwise, she was be paid nothing. If both also agreed on the amount of time spent together
each week the winning probability was increased to 75 percent. However, if the subjects names
a person who does not name them, then they will received nothing. Thus, subjects had ten
independent chances to win $0.50 because they could name up to ten friends. Following Leider
et al. (2009) we use a lottery-based incentive so that subjects could not definitively know if the
person they named had also named them. This avoids the problem that a subject may choose
not to list someone because they do not want to know if the person listed them back, or that a
subject would feel obliged to list someone to avoid giving offense.
Figure C1 in Appendix C shows how a subject reports a freshman friend. She first selects
the last initial of the friend in the first drop down menu. Then the system automatically filters
the second drop down menu so that all the last names in the drop down menu start with the
chosen last initial. Then the system again filters the third drop down menu so that it only
contains the names of freshmen with the chosen last name. After a subject chooses the first
name, the fourth drop down menu displays the university email address of this selected friend
6We timed how long it would take and determined that for most it would take about 10 minutes to answer all
of the questions.
7There are multiple ways to collect social network data. Advantages and disadvantages of those methods are
discussed in Carrington et al. (2005) and Brañas-Garza et al. (2013).
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for confirmation.
After selecting a friend, a subject also indicated how much time they spent with the friend
(the scale ranged from “0-30 minutes” to “more than 8 hours” per week) and also whether the
person was a roommate or not.8 We also incentivize truthful time reporting by telling a subject
that she can increase the probability to win the $0.50 prize from 50 percent to 75 percent for
each friend who lists her and also agrees on the amount of time spent. Thus, when subjects
completed part one, we obtained a list of whom they consider to be their ten best friends (as
well as a description of how much they interact with each friend). When a subject’s friend
completed the survey, we also see whether the friend lists her.
Once subjects completed part one, they were sent a link to part two of the study, the online
experiment. In this part of the study they were asked to make a series of financial decisions;
they had 30 minutes to complete the study. The online experiment included questions to elicit
the subjects level of altruism (using a dictator game), risk aversion, and time preferences. We
use diagnostic tasks to elicit risk, time and social preferences, as well as subjects’ guesses about
the behaviors of the ten friends from the friendship elicitation survey. For each preference we
use a diagnostic choice task that is well established in the literature to identify and measure
preferences along each of our dimensions. All the games and guesses are incentivized.
To elicit risk attitudes, we employ a 15 question multiple price list, where subjects make
choices between a 50-50 lottery with prizes of $200 or $0, and a fixed payoff that ranges from
$0 to $140. For time preferences, subjects make choices between an $80 payment in three
months, or a payment in two weeks that ranges from $5 to $75. See Figures C2 and C3 for a
picture of the two tasks.
For the social preference elicitation task (shown in Figure C4), subjects make a “dictator
allocation”, where they divide 100 tokens between themselves and another randomly selected
anonymous participant. Tokens are worth $0.75 to the person making the decision about how
to divide the tokens, and $1.50 for the anonymous recipient.
After subjects completed these parts, they were also asked to guess about the average
8We asked them to report the number of hours with the friend but not to include class time.
68
choices (among participants) of the ten friends from the friendship elicitation survey. They
were asked to guess if the average choices of their friends are similar to their own choice
(within +/- 1 for risk and time, +/- 10 for social preferences), or are above or below their own
choice. Subjects could also answer that they are not sure. Subjects were rewarded $1.00 for
correct guesses (and receive $0.50 if they say they are not sure).
Finally, subjects made un-incentivized self-reports about risk tolerance and patience (shown
in Figures C5 and C6). Subjects rated themselves on a 10 point scale. The risk scale ranges
from “risk averse” to “fully prepared to take risks”, while the patience scale ranges from “very
impatient” to “very patient”. Finally, subjects also reported how frequently they engage in
various activities (such as volunteering, attending religious activities, eating out and so on).
For payment of the online experiment, one out of every seven subjects were randomly
selected for payment. For selected subjects, we randomly selected one incentivized task, and
then for the risk and time preference tasks randomly selected one choice to implemented for
payment. All subjects were informed of this payment mechanism. Subjects could choose to be
paid via electronic or physical gift card, or check.
The two parts of Phase 1 were repeated three times in total (in Phase 1, 2 and 3). All phases
were identical to the procedures described above for Phase 1.
This design generates a panel dataset where for each subject (conditional on participation)
we observe their friendship linkages, and their preferences, at three points in time. If they have
friends who also participate we can also observe the preference of their friends. This allows
us to observe the two main dynamics of interest: changes in the social network over time,
and changes in preferences over time. We can then test for our two mechanisms of interest:
homophily based on economic preferences, and peer influence on economic preferences. The
results section below describes our analysis strategy and predictions.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Participation and Network Information
A total of 399 freshman participated in our experiment. However, subjects are most useful to
use when they participate in both the friendship elicitation and behavioral measurement sur-
vey. Furthermore, to answer many of our questions we need subjects to participate in multiple
phases of the experiment. Table 3.1 reports the number of students participating in each sur-
vey of each wave. We have approximately 200 students who participated fully in at least two
waves. Finally, for many of our research questions we need to have the friend of a subject
also participate. In total we have 199 subjects who fully participated in, and had a friend also
participate in, at least one phase.
Table 3.1: Student Participation
Phase Friendship Behavior Both
Phase 1 399 287 287
Phase 2 198 189 177
Phase 3 298 211 202
On average subjects had 1.2-1.5 friends who also participated (depending on the phase),
and for those friends the average amount of reported time spent together was “2 to 4 hours per
week”. Housing arrangements played an important role in friendships. In Phase 1 every student
listed their roommate as a friend, while in Phase 3 80% of students listed their roommate.
Similarly, 64% of friends in Phase 1, and 68% of friends in Phase 3, were from the same dorm.
Shared academics and activities were also relevant, with approximately 20% of friends having
the same major and approximately 50% of friends participating in the same club.
Figure 3.2 shows the measured social network from Phase 1 and 3. In Phase 1 there was one
large connected component of 242 students, and then a number of smaller components. The
average clustering coefficient was 0.181, while the average eigenvector centrality was 0.141.
Phase 3 had a somewhat more fracture network the largest component had 49 students, how-
ever there were three other moderately large components. The average clustering coefficient




Figure 3.2: Peers’ Non-ability Measures on Grades
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3.3.2 Behavioral Measurements
We next turn to the preferences and choices elicited by our behavioral survey. Table 3.2 reports
the average choices in our incentivized choice tasks, as well as the self-reported measures. For
both Risk and Time preferences almost every participant made monotonic choices. Subjects
were on average moderately risk averse, with the average indifference point being $75 (com-
pared to the lottery with an expected value of $100). As expected, the incentivized behavioral
measure is correlated with the self-reported measure of risk tolerance subjects who rated them-
selves higher on willingness to take risks chose the safe option fewer times (β = -.307, s.e. =
.081). Subjects were also moderately impatient, with the average indifference point being a
sooner payment of $64 (compared to a delayed payment of $80). The self-reported measure
for patience is also correlated with the behavioral measure subjects who rated themselves as
more patient chose the sooner payment less often (β = .260, s.e. = . 087). Allocations from our
social preference task indicates a moderate level of altruism, with the average allocation being
$45 for the decision-maker and $60 for the recipient.
While we are interested in how a student’s social context influences their preferences, and
hence we expect some amount of change in the observed preferences, we do want to make sure
that our behavioral measures are capturing true fundamental preferences. Therefore, we should
expect that the observed measures have in general a fair amount of stability. Fortunately, all of
our behavioral measures do appear to be fairly stable. Each measure is quite highly correlated
with itself in each pair of phases.9
3.3.3 Network Dynamics
We now examine in greater detail how the social network changed over the course of the year.
We can first observe that there is a fair amount of turnover among our subjects’ friendships.
9In order to make sure that there is no selection bias between those freshmen who agree to participate in our
survey and those who do not, in February 2016 we conduct the surveys again to compare a sample of subjects
recruited through these methods with subjects from the standard lab pool. To do so, we send out the network
survey to all current freshman 2016 cohort. Among those finish the network elicitation survey, we invite 80 of
them to take the behavior survey. Then we also contacted 80 randomly selected freshman students and invite them
to the same behavior survey as well. Both groups have the same behavior survey completion rate ( 4480 ). We see
no significant differences in survey responses between these two groups for any of our outcome measures. See
Appendix C for more details.
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Table 3.2: Behavioral Measures Summary Statistics
Behavioral Measures Self-Reported Measures
Risk Time Social Risk Time
Phase 1 8.53 3.21 59.5 5.76 5.88
Phase 2 8.58 3.21 59.86 5.79 6.16
Phase 3 8.17 3.51 60 5.83 6.04
Correlation (1 to 2) 0.532 0.549 0.528 0.614 0.601
Correlation (2 to 3) 0.637 0.609 0.603 0.775 0.522
Correlation (1 to 3) 0.534 0.616 0.475 0.633 0.524
Notes: The Risk behavioral measure reports the average number of safer choices. The Time behavioral measure reports the average number
of sooner choices. The Social behavioral measure reports the average allocation to the other recipient. The self-reported measures are
10-point scales with larger values denoting a greater willingness to take risks/be patient.
Between Phase 1 and Phase 2 subjects kept on average 6.3 friends, and changed 3.7 friends.
Between Phase 1 and Phase 3 subjects kept 5.5 friends and changed 4.5 friends. Our pri-
mary question, then, is what factors affect an individual’s decision to add or drop friends.
Specifically, are individuals more like to add friendships with individuals who are similar to
themselves on certain dimensions and/or more likely to drop friendships with those who are
dissimilar. Specifically, for each characteristic X, we want to see whether the absolute differ-
ence ∆X  }XiXj} in that characteristic between an individual i and a (potential) friend j is
predictive of a change in their friendship. We will use a probit specification as follows:
probpChangeijq  Φpα   β∆X   εq (3.1)
If students expressed homophily along a particular behavioral dimension we would expect
a negative β for additions (decreased likelihood of forming friendships with dissimilar others)
and a positive β for drops (increased likelihood of ending friendships with dissimilar others).
In analyzing added friendships we need to identify a pool of possible new friends. One
natural set of potential new friends is the other students from the same dorm. For another
measure, we use Clauset et al. (2004)’s community detection algorithm to identify the close
social environment of the student. The community detection algorithm partitions the social
network so that the number of links within communities is as large as possible, and the number
of links between communities is as small as possible. We can then use anyone in the student’s
community that is not currently their friend as a socially individual who is a candidate to be
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Table 3.3: Network Dynamics for Risk Measures
Panel A: Behavioral Measures
Add Friend Drop Relationship
From Dorm From Community Friend Community
Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Risk -0.0306 -0.0004 0.025 0.0012 0.033 0.0121 -0.0308** -0.0117**
(0.0198) (0.0003) (0.021) (0.0010) (0.0412) (0.015) (0.0141) (0.0054)
Const. -2.515*** -2.144*** -0.535*** 0.427***
(0.0714) (0.105) (0.191) (0.0831)
# Obs 11,854 1,957 180 1,374
Panel B: Self-Reported Measures
Add Friend Drop Relationship
From Dorm From Community Friend Community
Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Risk -0.0333 -0.0004 -0.0103 -0.0005 0.0482 0.0176 0.0176 0.0067
(0.0319) (0.0004) (0.0382) (0.0019) (0.0625) (0.0229) (0.025) (0.0095)
Const. -2.538*** -2.032*** -0.518*** 0.278***
(0.083) (0.116) (0.155) (0.085)
# Obs 11,854 1,957 180 1,374
Notes: All specifications are probit regressions with standard errors clustered at the subject level. Odd numbered columns report coefficients,
while even numbered columns report marginal effects. Dependent variables are: adding a friendship (columns 1-4), dropping a friendship
(columns 5-6), or ceasing to be in the same network community (columns 7-8). For columns 1-2 the sample includes all subjects who are in
the same dorm (but not currently a friend). For columns 3-4 the sample includes all subjects who are in the same network community (but not
currently a friend). For Panel A the independent variable is the absolute difference in the number of sure choices, while for Panel B it is the
absolute difference in the self-reported measure of risk tolerance.
a new friend. Similarly, we can look at changes in the network such that an individual is no
longer a friend, or no longer in the same community.
Table 3.3 reports the results of regressing the likelihood of adding a friend from the dorm or
network community and dropping a friendship or shared community, on the absolute difference
in risk measures. Panel A uses the incentivized behavioral measure of risk, while Panel B uses
the self-reported measure.
Overall we find relatively little evidence that risk attitudes matter for the dynamics of our
subjects’ social network. There is no effect of a pair’s similarity in either our incentivized
risk measure or the self-reported on the likelihood of adding or dropping direct friendship
linkages. We do see a significant effect for the likelihood of no longer being in the same
social community however the sign of the effect is the opposite of what one would expect
from a homophily dynamic. Our results suggest that a pair of individuals who have more
dissimilar risk attitudes are less likely to change social communities. Table 3.4 presents the
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same regression specifications for the absolute difference in patience. In line with our results
for risk attitudes, we find no effect of the difference in any measure of time preference on any
measure of network dynamics.
Table 3.4: Network Dynamics for Time Preference Measures
Panel A: Behavioral Measures
Add Friend Drop Relationship
From Dorm From Community Friend Community
Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Time -0.0112 -0.0001 0.0072 0.0003 0.0396 0.0145 -0.0179 -0.0068
(0.0181) (0.0002) (0.0239) (0.0011) (0.0386) (0.0141) (0.0152) (0.0058)
Const. -2.570*** -2.083*** -0.534*** 0.383***
(0.0795) (0.123) (0.152) (0.081)
# Obs 11,854 1,957 180 1,374
Panel B: Self-Reported Measures
Add Friend Drop Relationship
From Dorm From Community Friend Community
Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Time -0.0346 -0.0005 -0.0407 -0.0019 -0.0362 -0.0131 0.0093 0.0035
(0.0287) (0.0004) (0.0436) (0.0021) (0.0557) (0.0201) (0.0208) (0.0079)
Const. -2.522*** -1.960*** -0.341** 0.301***
(0.090) (0.141) (0.157) (0.087)
# Obs 11,854 1,957 180 1,374
Notes: All specifications are probit regressions with standard errors clustered at the subject level. Odd numbered columns report coefficients,
while even numbered columns report marginal effects. Dependent variables are: adding a friendship (columns 1-4), dropping a friendship
(columns 5-6), or ceasing to be in the same network community (columns 7-8). For columns 1-2 the sample includes all subjects who are in
the same dorm (but not currently a friend). For columns 3-4 the sample includes all subjects who are in the same network community (but not
currently a friend). For Panel A the independent variable is the absolute difference in the number of sooner choices, while for Panel B it is the
absolute difference in the self-reported measure of patience.
By contrast, we find evidence for differences in generosity influencing several dimensions
of change within the social network. Table 3.5 reports the results of regressing relationship
changes on the absolute difference in the number of tokens kept in the allocation game. We
find that an individual is significantly less likely to add a potential friend (either from the set
of students in the same dorm, or in the same social community) the more dissimilar they are in
generosity. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the difference in tokens kept would
lead to a 0.19 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of adding someone in the same dorm
as a friend, approximately half the base rate probability of 0.38% of adding them as a friend.
We also find that greater dissimilarity increases the likelihood of dropping a friendship with
someone. A one standard deviation increase the dissimilarity would increase the likelihood of
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dropping someone as a friend by 7.3 percentage points, one fifth of the base rate probability
of 33.9%. These results are consistent with students exhibiting homophily with respect to
generosity. Our subjects prefer to form friendships with those who are similarly generous, and
drop friendships with those who are differently generous.
Table 3.5: Network Dynamics for Generosity
Add Friend Drop Relationship
From Dorm From Community Friend Community
Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Kept -0.0108*** -0.0001*** -0.0110*** -0.0005*** 0.0107** 0.0039** 0.0021 0.0008
(0.0032) (0.000) (0.0042) (0.0002) (0.0051) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0009)
Const. -2.429*** -1.886*** -0.655*** 0.277***
(0.0639) (0.0835) (0.147) (0.0836)
# Obs 11,854 1,957 180 1,374
Notes: All specifications are probit regressions with standard errors clustered at the subject level. Odd numbered columns report coefficients,
while even numbered columns report marginal effects. Dependent variables are: adding a friendship (columns 1-4), dropping a friendship
(columns 5-6), or ceasing to be in the same network community (columns 7-8). For columns 1-2 the sample includes all subjects who are in
the same dorm (but not currently a friend). For columns 3-4 the sample includes all subjects who are in the same network community (but not
currently a friend). For Panel A the independent variable is the absolute difference in the number of sooner choices, while for Panel B it is the
absolute difference in the self-reported measure of patience.
Risk, time and social preferences are potentially subtle and hard to observe aspects of an
individuals behavior. While the effects of differences in generosity seem to be large compared
to the base rates for relationship changes, it is difficult to say whether the effect is as large as
one might expect. In order to provide an alternative benchmark, we can also examine the effect
on friendships of two clear markers of shared interests: sharing the same academic major, and
participating in the same extracurricular club. Intuition suggests that these traits should have a
strong effect on friendship formation and maintenance. For each pair of subjects we construct
an indicator variable IX that equals 1 if the two subjects share the same major, or participate
in the same club (respectively). We then estimate the previous regressions using the indicator
variable in place of the absolute difference measures:
probpChangeijq  Φpα   βIX   εq (3.2)
In these regressions homophily would predict a positive β for additions and a negative β
for drops. The results are reported in Table 3.6.
For shared major we find significant effects for reducing the likelihood of dropping a friend-
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ship, but no effect for adding a friendship. By contrast, we find a significant effect of shared
clubs for both adding and dropping friendships. If we compare these effects to the previously
estimated effect of differences in generosity, we see that the effect of shared activities is about
twice the magnitude of a one standard deviation difference in generosity. This provides an
alternative demonstration that homophily with respect to generosity plays a substantial role in
the changes in the social network.
Table 3.6: Network Dynamics for Shared Interests and Activities
Panel A: Same Major
Add Friend Drop Relationship
From Dorm From Community Friend Community
Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ISameMajor 0.0957 0.0012 -0.0152 -0.0004 -0.507* -0.171** -0.280** -0.109**
(0.0949) (0.00129) (0.0689) (0.00196) (0.270) (0.0825) (0.135) (0.0531)
Const. -2.681*** -2.287*** -0.316*** 0.362***
(0.0393) (0.0349) (0.115) (0.0685)
# Obs 23,684 21,176 180 1,374
Panel B: Same Club
Add Friend Drop Relationship
From Dorm From Community Friend Community
Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ISameClub 0.288*** 0.00417*** 0.392*** 0.0172*** -0.388* -0.144* -0.285*** -0.109***
(0.0796) (0.0015) (0.1070) (0.0066) (0.2080) (0.0779) (0.0890) (0.0341)
Const. -2.727*** -2.308*** -0.174 0.433***
(0.0420) (0.0329) (0.164) (0.0741)
# Obs 11,854 1,957 180 1,374
Notes: All specifications are probit regressions with standard errors clustered at the subject level. Odd numbered columns report coefficients,
while even numbered columns report marginal effects. Dependent variables are: adding a friendship (columns 1-4), dropping a friendship
(columns 5-6), or ceasing to be in the same network community (columns 7-8). For columns 1-2 the sample includes all subjects who are in
the same dorm (but not currently a friend). For columns 3-4 the sample includes all subjects who are in the same network community (but not
currently a friend). For Panel A the independent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the two students share the same major,
while for Panel B it is an indicator variable that equals one if the two students participate in the same club.
One potential reason why behavioral and preference differences do not play a larger role in
friendship dynamics is that subjects had quite inaccurate beliefs about their friends’ behavior.
Subjects accurately predicted the average choices of their friends 39% of the time for lottery
choices, 43% of the time for time preference choices, and 46% of the time for token allocations.
Inaccurate beliefs were primarily driven by subjects overestimating how similar their choices
were to their friends. The bias was largest for risk preferences, where 70% of subjects guessed
that they made the same lottery choices as their friends, while only 27% of them did. Similarly,
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74% of subjects guessed that they made the same payment timing choices as their friends,
compared to 37% that actually did so. In both cases belief accuracy was significantly lower for
those who guessed their friends were the same (p   0.01 in both cases). Subjects also believed
they made similar generosity choices as their friends, but they were more correct in doing so:
74% guessed they made the same choices, compared to 62% who actually did so.
This may suggest that the observed homophily for social preferences is primarily an uncon-
scious behavior. Subjects believe that their friends are similar on all three preference dimen-
sions, and do not recognize the differences with their friends for risk tolerance and patience.
Explicitly sorting based on preferences would require individuals to be able to accurately infer
the preferences of others, which our data suggests they cannot do very well. We note that Lei-
der et al (2010) also found that subjects had somewhat inaccurate beliefs about their friends.
They found that although subjects were approximately accurate in predicting how much more
their friends would allocate to them in a dictator game, they were completely unable to identify
which friends would be relatively more or less generous.
However, we can show that the sorting behavior we observe for generosity is not simply a
side effect of sharing the same major or extracurricular activity. Table 3.7 reports the results
from regressing network changes on differences in generosity while also controlling for shared
major or club. Our results are largely unchanged, which suggests that other factors, such as
direct interpersonal kindness, must be the driver of sorting on generosity.
Network centrality is another natural characteristic to explain the changes in the observed
social network throughout the study. The network formation literature (see de Solla Price
(1976) and Barabasi and Albert (1999)) suggests that if individuals choose whether to form
and maintain friendships based on the instrumentality of the relationship then nodes that are
central in the network will be particularly desirable.10 We examine two measures of network
centrality. Eigenvector centrality (CEigen) uses the eigenvector for the principle eigenvalue of
10de Solla Price (1976) proposed this mechanism as cumulative advantage, known today more commonly as
preferential attachment (a term introduced by Barabasi and Albert (1999)). The preferential attachment mecha-
nism assumes that a new node prefers to connect to existing nodes with more links (a larger degree). This generates
a rich-get-richer effect as existing nodes with high degrees gain more links faster than nodes with low degrees.
The advantage of the preferential attachment model is that it can reproduce networks with commonly observed
power-law degree distributions.
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Table 3.7: Network Dynamics for Generosity controlling for Major/Club
Panel A: Same Major
Add Friend Drop Relationship
From Dorm From Community Friend Community
Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Kept -0.0117*** -0.0001*** -0.0119*** -0.0005*** 0.0132** 0.0048** 0.0036 0.0010
(0.0031) (0.0000) (0.0042) (0.0002) (0.0051) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0009)
ISameMajor 0.362*** 0.369*** -0.605** -0.291**
(0.108) (0.149) (0.294) (0.135)
Const. -2.480*** -1.934*** -0.591*** 0.315***
(0.0731) (0.0940) (0.153) (0.0842)
# Obs 11,854 1,957 180 1,374
Panel B: Same Club
Add Friend Drop Relationship
From Dorm From Community Friend Community
Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Kept -0.0112*** -0.0001*** -0.0114*** -0.0005*** 0.0121** 0.0044** 0.0023 0.0009
(0.0032) (0.0000) (0.0042) (0.0002) (0.0052) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0009)
ISameClub 0.298*** 0.239* -0.438** -0.287***
(0.095) (0.131) (0.211) (0.089)
Const. -2.537*** -1.967*** -0.412** 0.391***
(0.0420) (0.0329) (0.164) (0.0741)
# Obs 11,854 1,957 180 1,374
Notes: All specifications are probit regressions with standard errors clustered at the subject level. Odd numbered columns report coefficients,
while even numbered columns report marginal effects. Dependent variables are: adding a friendship (columns 1-4), dropping a friendship
(columns 5-6), or ceasing to be in the same network community (columns 7-8). For columns 1-2 the sample includes all subjects who are in
the same dorm (but not currently a friend). For columns 3-4 the sample includes all subjects who are in the same network community (but not
currently a friend). The first independent variable is the absolute difference in the number of tokens kept in the allocation decision. For Panel
A the second independent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the two students share the same major, while for Panel B it is an
indicator variable that equals one if the two students participate in the same club.
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the adjacency matrix as the measure of centrality. With this measure, an individual is assigned
more centrality if they are connected to others who are themselves highly central. Betweenness
centrality (CBetween) counts the number of shortest paths that pass through the individual. For
betweenness centrality, an individual is assigned more centrality if they help connect many
other people together.
We use the observed social network in Period 1, calculate the centrality for each individual,
and then examine whether the changes in the network between Period 1 and Period 3 are driven
by the centrality of the individuals. We estimate the previous relationship change regressions
using the centrality measures as the independent variables:
probpChangeijq  Φpα   βCX   εq (3.3)
In these regressions, if individuals prefer to form and maintain friendships with highly
central individuals, we would expect a positive β for additions and a negative for drops. The
results are reported in Table 3.8.
Our results are broadly consistent with a preference to form and maintain relationships
with central individual, with similar results for both measures. In particular, the preference for
centrality seems to be more important for maintaining relationships than in forming new ones.
This difference could be because it is hard to know the network position of people you are not
already socially close with. Difficulty knowing the network position of potential friends could
help explain why we find an effect for adding from the community compared to adding from
the dorm. Subjects may be more likely to know the network position of people who are already
in their social environment.
The effect of network centrality on friendship dynamics appears to be somewhat smaller
than the effect of homophily. A one standard deviation increase in the network centrality of a
potential friend from the network community increases the likelihood of forming a friendship
by .014 percentage points (approximately one-tenth of the base rate) for eigenvector centrality,
and .024 percentage points (approximately one-fifth of the base rate) for betweenness central-
ity. Recall that the effect of decreased similarity in generosity was about half the base rate.
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Table 3.8: Network Dynamics for Network Centrality
Panel A: Eigenvector Centrality
Add Friend Drop Relationship
From Dorm From Community Friend Community
Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CEigen 0.203 0.002 1.578*** 0.006*** -3.782*** -1.470*** -3.786*** -0.679***
(0.499) (0.004) (0.480) (0.002) (1.002) (0.389) (0.446) (0.084)
Const. -2.767*** -3.054*** 0.252*** 1.280***
(0.0371) (0.0308) (0.0376) (0.0162)
# Obs 31,887 200,168 3,975 201,610
Panel B: Betweenness Centrality
Add Friend Drop Relationship
From Dorm From Community Friend Community
Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CBetween 4.244 0.0370 11.68*** 0.0444*** -3.976 -1.545 -21.13*** -3.780***
(5.142) (0.045) (2.856) (0.011) (3.664) (1.423) (0.792) (0.187)
Const. -2.810*** -3.080*** 0.241*** 1.319***
(0.0693) (0.0327) (0.0399) (0.0159)
# Obs 31,887 200,168 3,975 201,610
Notes: All specifications are probit regressions with standard errors clustered at the subject level. Odd numbered columns report coefficients,
while even numbered columns report marginal effects. Dependent variables are: adding a friendship (columns 1-4), dropping a friendship
(columns 5-6), or ceasing to be in the same network community (columns 7-8). For columns 1-2 the sample includes all subjects who are in
the same dorm (but not currently a friend). For columns 3-4 the sample includes all subjects who are in the same network community (but not
currently a friend). For Panel A the independent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the two students share the same major,
while for Panel B it is an indicator variable that equals one if the two students participate in the same club.
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Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in eigenvector centrality decreases the likelihood
of dropping a friendship by 5 percentage points (approximately one-twelfth the base rate), and
a one standard deviation increase in betweenness centrality decreases the likelihood by 0.9 per-
centage points (1.5% of the base rate). By contrast, the effect of decreasing similarity was
one-fifth the base rate.
3.3.4 Influence Effects on Preferences
We now turn to our second research question: Are an individual’s economic preferences influ-
enced by the social context the individual experiences? Specifically, is an individual’s risk, time
or social preferences correlated with the average preferences of his or her friends (or broader
social community). To measure this effect, we use the following specification:
Preferencei,t  α   βPreferencei,t∆t   ε (3.4)
Preferencei,t denotes the choice in the preference elicitation task (or the self-reported pref-
erence measure) for individual i in Phase t. Preferencei,t∆t is the average choice (or self-
report) for the individuals friends (or network community) in Phase t-∆t. The error term ε is
clustered at the subject level, allowing for arbitrary correlations in the choices/reports of the
focal individual. As before we also look at the network community as a broader measure of the
individual’s social context. The network community specifications also have a somewhat larger
sample size, as some subjects did not have direct friends who also took the behavioral survey.
We look at both the contemporaneous correlation (∆t = 0; e.g. April preferences as a
function of April friends’ preferences), as well as the correlation with the individual’s friends
from earlier in the year (∆t = 1 or 2; e.g. April preferences as a function of January or October
friends’ preferences). We are interested in looking at the effect of friends at various different
time lags for several reasons. First, if we focused on the contemporaneous correlation we might
worry that it was due simply to common shocks or contextual factors. However, it is unlikely
that I would experience the same shock today that my friends experienced three months ago.
Second, it is not immediately clear over what time scale we should expect to see influence
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effects. An individual’s current social context may be the most prominent, on the other hand it
may take an extended amount of time and/or sustained exposure for influence to occur. On the
other hand, the shared experiences with friends from too long ago may have faded in memory
or influence. Third, seeing effects at multiple lags would actually be the most encouraging
result as it would be the clearest and most robust evidence for influence. Seeing a significant
effect only with a one period lag, for example, could represent real influence that is highly time
sensitive, or it could be a spurious correlation. Consistent correlations across multiple time
periods are less likely to be spurious.
As an additional robustness check, we also consider specifications using the focal individ-
ual’s previous choices and reports:
Preferencei,t  α   βPreferencei,t∆t   γPreferencei,t1   ε (3.5)
Preferencei,t  α   βPreferencei,t∆t   γPreferencei,t2   ε (3.6)
This provides a more direct control of the individual’s “initial” preference than just the
clustered standard errors. However, the structure of our data does give us a smaller sample size
for many specifications.
One caveat to keep in mind is that we are using the individual’s measured social network in
the reference period this means that in the contemporaneous influence specification, for exam-
ple, the set of friends that make up Preference-i is changing over the course of the experiment.
If there are strong homophily effects in the social network dynamics this could drive positive
correlation in later periods. We have several ways of addressing this problem. First, we cluster
the errors at the subject level, so if the subject’s preferences are primarily fixed (or evolving
for non-influence reasons) the repeated measures should help account for this. Additionally,
for risk and time preferences the changing social network is unlikely to be a problem in this
respect, as we have already demonstrated that there is no significant homophily on these di-
mensions. For generosity this could be a problem for ∆t  0 or 1. However, this is unlikely
to be driving results for ∆t  2, which uses the friends from the social network measured in
83
October to predict behavior in April. At this point there has been very little time for homophily
to shape the social network, so a homophily-driven correlation is unlikely. Finally, if the ob-
served correlation is primarily driven by homophily changing the network, we would expect the
correlation to strengthen as the lag shrinks from 2 to 0 and there is more time for homophily to
shape the network.
Table 3.9 reports the results of regressing our measures of risk preferences on the average
measure for friends and social communities. We find essentially zero correlation for the in-
centivized elicitation task, however we do find a significant positive correlation for five of the
six specifications using the self-reported measure (and a positive but insignificant result for the
sixth). Additionally, we do not find that the magnitude of the effect is systematically growing
as we go from ∆t  2 to ∆t  0, suggesting that this is not simply a reflection of underly-
ing homophily. As a demonstration of the magnitude of the influence effect, a one standard
deviation increase in the average self-reported risk measure for an individual’s friends is pre-
dicted to increase that individual’s self report in the same time period by 0.25 categories (1/8th
of a standard deviation). We find similar sized effects for the influence of the broader social
community, with a one standard deviation increase the average self-report for an individual’s
community corresponding to increase in the individual’s report of 0.21 categories (1/10th of a
standard deviation). This suggests that both an individual’s immediate friends and the larger
social context can have a significant influence on risk attitudes.
Table 3.10 reports the corresponding specifications with once- and twice-lagged dependent
variables included as additional controls. We find results that are largely consistent with our
main specification, albeit with a reduction in power, likely due to a smaller sample size. All
of the estimated coefficients for the self-reported measure are positive, with many of them
remaining statistically significant.
Table 3.11 reports the results of the time preference regressions. For this measure we find
similar, albeit slightly weaker evidence, for social influence using the incentivized behavioral
measure. We find a strongly significant result for the contemporaneous friends regression,
and similar magnitudes but weaker significance for the lagged regressions. For the commu-
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Table 3.9: Influence Effects for Risk Measures
Panel A: Behavioral Measures
-i = Avg of Friends -i = Avg of Community
∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2 ∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Riski,t∆t 0.0083 -0.0506 0.0298 -0.0853 0.11 0.0403
(0.0668) (0.115) (0.123) (0.088) (0.122) (0.198)
Constant 8.381*** 8.794*** 7.925*** 9.195*** 7.503*** 7.860***
(0.629) (1.081) (1.099) (0.768) (1.084) (1.736)
# Obs 380 139 97 648 306 197
Panel B: Self-Reported Measures
-i = Avg of Friends -i = Avg of Community
∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2 ∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Riski,t∆t 0.148** 0.322*** 0.151 0.202** 0.212* 0.298**
(0.067) (0.113) (0.125) (0.087) (0.124) (0.133)
Constant 4.874*** 4.123*** 4.918*** 4.592*** 4.499*** 4.096***
(0.431) (0.745) (0.780) (0.531) (0.773) (0.807)
# Obs 380 139 97 648 306 197
Notes: All specifications are OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the subject level. The dependent measure is the number of safe
choices (Panel A) or self-reported risk measure (Panel B) of the focal individual. The independent measure is the average choice/report of the
focal individual’s friends (columns 1-3) or network community (columns 4-6). Columns 1 and 4 report the contemporaneous correlation
(∆t  0), columns 2 and 5 use the one-period lagged friend/community average (∆t  1), while Columns 3 and 6 use the two-period lagged
average (∆t  2).
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Table 3.10: Influence Effects for Risk Measures with Lagged Choices
Panel A: Behavioral Measures, Once-Lagged Choices
-i = Avg of Friends -i = Avg of Community
∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2 ∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Riski,t∆t 0.0252 -0.0206 0.182 -0.029 0.0985 0.285*
(0.092) (0.085) (0.181) (0.098) (0.095) (0.163)
Riski,t1 0.485*** 0.484*** 0.588*** 0.588*** 0.587*** 0.633***
(0.111) (0.112) (0.151) (0.063) (0.063) (0.068)
Constant 3.969*** 4.371*** 1.423 3.551*** 2.465** 0.371
(1.427) (1.340) (2.093) (1.117) (0.978) (1.651)
# Obs 139 139 55 306 306 141
Panel B: Behavioral Measures, Twice-Lagged Choices
-i = Avg of Friends -i = Avg of Community
∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2 ∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Riski,t∆t -0.186 0.257 0.011 -0.324*** 0.252** 0.148
(0.125) (0.163) (0.101) (0.110) (0.121) (0.176)
Riski,t2 0.385*** 0.388*** 0.388*** 0.470*** 0.534*** 0.489***
(0.121) (0.143) (0.122) (0.077) (0.086) (0.077)
Constant 6.429*** 2.421 4.754*** 6.795*** 1.406 2.691
(1.729) (1.683) (1.455) (1.189) (1.227) (1.669)
# Obs 97 55 97 197 141 197
Panel C: Self-Reported Measures, Once-Lagged Choices
-i = Avg of Friends -i = Avg of Community
∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2 ∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Riski,t∆t 0.071 0.213** 0.128 0.041 0.089 0.374***
(0.097) (0.082) (0.178) (0.101) (0.095) (0.133)
Riski,t1 0.673*** 0.658*** 0.638*** 0.665*** 0.663*** 0.698***
(0.084) (0.080) (0.109) (0.055) (0.054) (0.057)
Constant 1.596** 0.874 1.177 1.688** 1.425** -0.467
(0.719) (0.661) (1.425) (0.671) (0.673) (0.747)
# Obs 139 139 55 306 306 141
Panel D: Self-Reported Measures, Twice-Lagged Choices
-i = Avg of Friends -i = Avg of Community
∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2 ∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Riski,t∆t 0.198** 0.252* 0.0290 0.209** 0.163 0.0850
(0.0978) (0.144) (0.106) (0.103) (0.131) (0.111)
Riski,t2 0.553*** 0.557*** 0.557*** 0.617*** 0.701*** 0.613***
(0.0829) (0.149) (0.0904) (0.0594) (0.0712) (0.0621)
Constant 1.407* 1.211 2.397*** 1.045* 0.807 1.790**
(0.774) (0.962) (0.785) (0.586) (0.822) (0.688)
# Obs 97 55 97 197 141 197
Notes: All specifications are OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the subject level. The dependent measure is the number of safe
choices (Panels A and B) or self-reported risk measure (Panels C and D) of the focal individual. The first independent measure is the average
choice/report of the focal individual’s friends (columns 1-3) or network community (columns 4-6). Columns 1 and 4 report the
contemporaneous correlation ( ∆t  0), columns 2 and 5 use the one-period lagged friend/community average ( ∆t  1), while Columns 3
and 6 use the two-period lagged average ( ∆t  2). Panels A and C also include the focal individuals’ choice/report from the previous
period, while Panels B and D include the focal individuals’ choice/report from two periods ago.
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nity regressions we see marginal significantly only in the contemporaneous regression, and
no significance for the lagged regressions. The magnitude of the contemporaneous effect is
similar to the risk preference effect: a one standard deviation increase in the average number
of sooner choice by an individual’s friends increases the average number of the individual’s
sooner choices by 0.48 (an increase in the indifference point of $2.39, equal to 1/7th a standard
deviation). A one standard deviation increase in the community average would increase the
number of sooner choices by 0.27 (a $1.34 increase in the indifference point, equal to 1/12th a
standard deviation). We find no corresponding influence effect for the self-reported measure of
patience.
Table 3.11: Influence Effects for Patience Measures
Panel A: Behavioral Measures
-i = Avg of Friends -i = Avg of Community
∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2 ∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Timei,t∆t 0.168*** 0.242* 0.202* 0.159* 0.035 0.089
(0.062) (0.125) (0.105) (0.084) (0.113) (0.126)
Constant 2.623*** 2.758*** 2.495*** 2.733*** 2.954*** 3.161***
(0.281) (0.499) (0.437) (0.313) (0.401) (0.456)
# Obs 380 139 97 648 306 197
Panel B: Self-Reported Measures
-i = Avg of Friends -i = Avg of Community
∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2 ∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Timei,t∆t 0.099 0.127 0.116 -0.163** 0.147 -0.048
(0.065) (0.108) (0.126) (0.081) (0.134) (0.166)
Constant 5.406*** 5.359*** 5.365*** 6.972*** 5.220*** 6.332***
(0.414) (0.708) (0.767) (0.489) (0.797) (0.996)
# Obs 362 137 95 631 306 197
Notes: All specifications are OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the subject level. The dependent measure is the number of
sooner choices (Panel A) or self-reported patience measure (Panel B) of the focal individual. The independent measure is the average
choice/report of the focal individual’s friends (columns 1-3) or network community (columns 4-6). Columns 1 and 4 report the
contemporaneous correlation (∆t  0), columns 2 and 5 use the one-period lagged friend/community average (∆t  1), while Columns 3
and 6 use the two-period lagged average (∆t  2).
As before, we also consider specifications with lagged dependent variables as a robustness
check. These results are reported in Table 3.12. Our previous results for patience appear to
be less robust to this alternate specification than the results for risk tolerance. None of the
coefficients for the self-reported measure remain significant, and many of them are smaller
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in magnitude. However, we again note that this robustness check comes with a significant
reduction in our sample size.
We report the results for generosity in Table 3.13. Here we actually see a negative influ-
ence effect, with individuals that are part of generous social communities becoming signifi-
cantly more selfish. Specifically, if the average generosity of an individual’s social community
increases by one standard deviation, the results predict the individual’s own generosity to de-
crease by 1.9 tokens (or $2.85 for the recipient, equal to 1/11 a standard deviation). The results
for friends also have a negative sign, however the effect size is small and the coefficients are
not close to significance. While we did not anticipate this reverse-influence effect, we do note
that Ahern et al. (2013) also found negative peer effects for generosity. It is possible that this
is a form of free-riding, where individuals attempt to benefit from the generosity of their social
context. We also note that this free-riding has limits, since if an individual becomes too dis-
similar from their friends and social community the previously demonstrated homophily effect
will increase the chances that they are cut off from the network.
We report the robustness specifications with lagged choices in Table 3.14 For both alternate
specifications we again find evidence for the negative influence effect of an individual’s com-
munity, with similar magnitudes and levels of significance. We also now find some significant
negative effects for the regressions using friends’ choices. While we had not anticipated finding
this free-riding result, the effect appears to be quite robust.
3.4 Conclusion
Using a longitudinal design to follow freshman during their first year at university, we test for
and demonstrate selection based on preferences and dynamic preference formation for three
key and fundamental economic preferences: social risk and time preferences. We use a lon-
gitudinal design, in which we follow incoming freshman through their first academic year at
their university. Subjects participate in three waves of an online experiment where we elicit
their social network using an incentive compatible mechanism and then measure participants’
levels of risk attitudes, time preferences and altruism using economic games.
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Table 3.12: Influence Effects for Patience Measures with Lagged Choices
Panel A: Behavioral Measures, Once-Lagged Choices
-i = Avg of Friends -i = Avg of Community
∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2 ∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Timei,t∆t 0.0929 0.127 0.130 0.0481 -0.0608 0.0864
(0.121) (0.131) (0.126) (0.0877) (0.0843) (0.115)
Timei,t1 0.481*** 0.470*** 0.519*** 0.528*** 0.533*** 0.626***
(0.105) (0.110) (0.129) (0.0695) (0.0698) (0.0788)
Constant 1.680*** 1.636*** 0.958 1.347*** 1.678*** 0.881*
(0.456) (0.419) (0.745) (0.347) (0.310) (0.461)
# Obs 139 139 55 306 306 141
Panel B: Behavioral Measures, Twice-Lagged Choices
-i = Avg of Friends -i = Avg of Community
∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2 ∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Timei,t∆t 0.101 0.0178 0.0644 -0.0311 -0.0100 -0.101
(0.0907) (0.180) (0.106) (0.109) (0.129) (0.0911)
Timei,t2 0.467*** 0.441*** 0.459*** 0.609*** 0.570*** 0.614***
(0.106) (0.147) (0.114) (0.0711) (0.0851) (0.0700)
Constant 1.454*** 1.808** 1.629*** 1.692*** 1.529*** 1.895***
(0.514) (0.716) (0.452) (0.436) (0.488) (0.404)
# Obs 97 55 97 197 141 197
Panel C: Self-Reported Measures, Once-Lagged Choices
-i = Avg of Friends -i = Avg of Community
∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2 ∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Timei,t∆t 0.0002 -0.0294 0.144 -0.125 0.258** -0.109
(0.0702) (0.0799) (0.117) (0.102) (0.115) (0.181)
Timei,t1 0.647*** 0.653*** 0.594*** 0.535*** 0.554*** 0.518***
(0.0686) (0.0670) (0.120) (0.0652) (0.0605) (0.0790)
Constant 2.249*** 2.415*** 1.653 3.671*** 1.246* 3.552***
(0.615) (0.689) (0.993) (0.865) (0.645) (1.148)
# Obs 137 135 54 303 303 141
Panel D: Self-Reported Measures, Twice-Lagged Choices
-i = Avg of Friends -i = Avg of Community
∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2 ∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Timei,t∆t 0.0132 0.120 0.0144 -0.0724 0.158 0.00307
(0.0925) (0.147) (0.125) (0.128) (0.107) (0.135)
Timei,t2 0.406*** 0.377** 0.408*** 0.483*** 0.524*** 0.484***
(0.100) (0.147) (0.102) (0.067) (0.075) (0.067)
Constant 3.628*** 3.132** 3.648*** 3.603*** 2.032** 3.139***
(0.797) (1.229) (0.879) (0.892) (0.867) (0.859)
# Obs 95 55 93 191 139 191
Notes: All specifications are OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the subject level. The dependent measure is the number of
sooner choices (Panels A and B) or self-reported patience measure (Panels C and D) of the focal individual. The first independent measure is
the average choice/report of the focal individual’s friends (columns 1-3) or network community (columns 4-6). Columns 1 and 4 report the
contemporaneous correlation (∆t  0), columns 2 and 5 use the one-period lagged friend/community average (∆t  1), while Columns 3
and 6 use the two-period lagged average (∆t  2). Panels A and C also include the focal individuals’ choice/report from the previous period,
while Panels B and D include the focal individuals’ choice/report from two periods ago.
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Table 3.13: Influence Effects for Generosity Measures
-i = Avg of Friends -i = Avg of Community
∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2 ∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Kepti,t∆t -0.0553 -0.0295 -0.0497 -0.172** -0.0611 -0.463**
(0.0617) (0.103) (0.121) (0.0794) (0.149) (0.222)
Constant 63.41*** 62.63*** 63.53*** 69.92*** 63.92*** 87.10***
(3.854) (6.100) (7.708) (4.644) (9.032) (13.47)
# Obs 380 139 97 648 306 197
Notes: All specifications are OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the subject level. The dependent measure is the number of
tokens kept by the focal individual. The independent measure is the average choice of the focal individual’s friends (columns 1-3) or network
community (columns 4-6). Columns 1 and 4 report the contemporaneous correlation (∆t  0), columns 2 and 5 use the one-period lagged
friend/community average (∆t  1), while Columns 3 and 6 use the two-period lagged average (∆t  2).
Table 3.14: Influence Effects for Generosity Measures with Lagged Choices
Panel A: Once-Lagged Choices
-i = Avg of Friends -i = Avg of Community
∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2 ∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Kepti,t∆t -0.253*** -0.0562 -0.173 -0.182** -0.0625 -0.499**
(0.0942) (0.101) (0.137) (0.0799) (0.112) (0.193)
Kepti,t1 0.480*** 0.469*** 0.541*** 0.604*** 0.613*** 0.654***
(0.114) (0.118) (0.165) (0.081) (0.082) (0.111)
Constant 45.94*** 35.61*** 41.07*** 35.02*** 27.39*** 50.90***
(9.939) (10.25) (14.09) (7.336) (9.141) (14.57)
# Obs 139 139 55 306 306 141
Panel B: Twice-Lagged Choices
-i = Avg of Friends -i = Avg of Community
∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2 ∆t  0 ∆t  1 ∆t  2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Kepti,t∆t -0.0673 -0.367* -0.0243 -0.256** -0.148 -0.438**
(0.120) (0.200) (0.133) (0.117) (0.165) (0.203)
Kepti,t2 0.432*** 0.373** 0.437*** 0.513*** 0.582*** 0.517***
(0.139) (0.142) (0.140) (0.0949) (0.109) (0.0978)
Constant 38.92*** 64.36*** 36.09** 45.25*** 35.70*** 55.77***
(13.06) (15.95) (14.37) (9.945) (13.56) (13.83)
# Obs 97 55 97 197 141 197
Notes: All specifications are OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the subject level. The dependent measure is the number of
tokens kept by the focal individual. The independent measure is the average choice of the focal individual’s friends (columns 1-3) or network
community (columns 4-6). Columns 1 and 4 report the contemporaneous correlation (∆t  0), columns 2 and 5 use the one-period lagged
friend/community average (∆t  1), while Columns 3 and 6 use the two-period lagged average (∆t  2). Panel A also includes the focal
individuals’ choice from the previous period, while Panels B includes the focal individuals’ choice from two periods ago.
90
We find evidence for each mechanism on at least one important preference. We show that
changes in subject’s social networks are significantly influenced the similarity or dissimilarity
in generosity (as measured by a standard lab-style dictator task). Students who are similarly
generous are more likely to become friends, and less likely to end a pre-existing friendship. The
effects of homophily for altruism are of a similar magnitude to other key predictors of network
changes, such as participating in the same activities, or the network centrality of the (potential)
friend. Additionally, we find evidence for peer influence for both self-reported tolerance for
risk and our incentivized measure of patience. The influence effect is robust to looking at
both contemporaneous and lagged behavior in the network, and is of substantial magnitude: a
one standard deviation change in the average behavior of others is associated with a 1/7th to
1/12th standard deviation change in the corresponding behavior of the focal individual. We
additionally find surprising evidence for a negative peer effect on generosity, consistent with
free-riding behavior.
Our work advances both the understanding of how a student’s social network and prefer-
ences evolve upon entering college, and how a student’s social network affects one’s economic
preferences. We focused on studying students during their freshman year, as it is a time of
substantial personal and social change. This gave us the best chance to observe homophily and
peer influence on preferences. However, one potential concern is that this might represent the
high point for these mechanisms. Whether these mechanisms continue to be important later in
life is an open question for future research.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix for Chapter One
Figure A.1: Positive Correlation btw. Study Buddy and Grades based on Past Feedback
98
Figure A.2: Score Correlation
99
(a) Likelihood of Using
(b) Intensity of Use
Figure A.3: Increasing Usage with More Total Partners
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Table A.1: Comparing Respondents and Nonrespondents
Respondents Nonrespondents T Test
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Diff. t.stat.
Female 0.583 0.493 1564 0.417 0.493 592 0.166*** 6.95
White 0.613 0.487 1564 0.606 0.489 592 0.007 0.29
Black 0.025 0.156 1564 0.052 0.223 592 -0.027** -3.21
Asian 0.221 0.415 1564 0.193 0.395 592 0.029 1.45
Hispanic 0.041 0.198 1564 0.051 0.220 592 -0.010 -0.99
In State 0.590 0.492 1564 0.600 0.490 592 -0.010 -0.43
Freshman 0.108 0.310 1564 0.102 0.303 592 0.006 0.39
Sophomore 0.474 0.499 1564 0.380 0.486 592 0.094*** 3.93
Junior 0.304 0.460 1564 0.371 0.484 592 -0.067** -2.97
Senior 0.113 0.317 1564 0.146 0.353 592 -0.032* -2.05
HS GPA 3.833 0.167 1441 3.761 0.230 536 0.072*** 7.65
College GPA 3.413 0.414 1538 3.148 0.529 577 0.266*** 12.15
Withdraw 0.001 0.025 1564 0.046 0.209 592 -0.045*** -8.36
Final Grade 3.275 0.706 1562 2.621 1.055 564 0.655*** 16.39
Notes: Nonrespondents refer to those students who did not respond to the network elicitation question after Exam 2.
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Table A.2: Network Dynamics
Logit (1) (2) (3) (4)
Source Ñ Target Drop Is Dropped Add Is Added
Source is Treated -0.086 -0.111
(0.122) (0.290)
Target is Treated 0.088 0.001
(0.104) (0.301)
Obs. 2248 2248 47709 47709
Cluster Source Target Source Target
Notes: This table compare the two networks, one elicited after Exam 2 and the other elicited after Exam 3, in
order to see what predicts the network dynamics.
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Table A.3: Study Buddy “Or” Networks Summary Statistics
Post Exam Surveys Exam 2 Exam 3
# Respondents (%) 1564 (73%) 1896 (88%)
% Female 0.58 0.55
% Listing a study or talking buddy 0.71 0.62
# Nodes 1604 1668
# Edges 2422 2558
avg. # buddies listed (out degree) 2.2 2.2
Unique pairs 1915 2005
% edges between female students 0.47 0.44
% edges between male students 0.25 0.28
% edges between male and female students 0.27 0.28
% edges reciprocated if both in survey 0.52 0.47
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OLS (1) (2) (3)
Exam 1 Score Exam 2 Score Exam 3 Score
In-degree 0.149 0.602** 0.503**
(0.181) (0.260) (0.212)
Out-degree 0.200 0.854*** 0.526***
(0.145) (0.210) (0.186)
Page Rank 601.8 2154*** 1634***
(384.5) (500.8) (484.7)
Eigenvector -1.388 2.947 3.088
(2.748) (2.933) (2.287)
Closeness 0.913 3.181*** 2.962***
(0.567) (0.884) (0.734)
Betweenness -828.8 -379.5 -443.8
(839.6) (1200.0) (1009.0)
Notes: In each column, each row is a separate OLS regression between i’s grade and a network position
measure, controlling for the same set of control variables as used in all the other regressions. All the
exam scores are standardized. In-degree is the number of students that list i as a study buddy. Out-
degree is the number of students that i lists. Page rank is an algorithm to quantify the importance of a
node. Eigenvector is another global measure that is calculated based on the network adjacency matrix.
Closeness centrality is defined as the inverse of farness, which in turn, is the sum of distances to all
other nodes. Finally betweenness centrality is equal to the number of shortest paths from all nodes to all
others that pass through i.
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Table A.5: Treatment and Spillover Effects on Applet Use (Using Fractions Treated)
Panel A: (1) (2) (3)
Ever Used LPM Logit Tobit
Ti (β) 0.108** 0.101** 0.103***
(0.046) (0.043) (0.035)
FriTreated%i (γ) 0.072 0.064 0.085***
(0.052) (0.050) (0.042)
Ti*FriTreated%i (ρ) -0.138** -0.130** -0.128***
(0.057) (0.055) (0.048)
Control Mean 0.555 0.555 0.555
Control S.D. (0.498) (0.498) (0.498)
p-value: γ   ρ  0 0.043 0.048 0.133
Obs. 3054 3054 3054
Panel B: (1) (2) (3) (4)
#Questions OLS Tobit Poisson Negative
Answered Binomial
Ti (β) 8.050*** 8.477*** 9.688*** 9.163***
(2.592) (2.842) (3.243) (3.404)
FriTreated%i (γ) 7.378* 6.948** 8.910** 7.236*
(3.844) (3.481) (4.167) (3.934)
Ti*FriTreated%i (ρ) -10.13** -10.53*** -11.90*** -10.33**
(4.163) (3.877) (4.565) (4.471)
Control Mean 16.83 16.83 16.83 16.83
Control S.D. (23.17) (23.17) (23.17) (23.17)
p-value: γ   ρ  0 0.341 0.133 0.284 0.246
Obs. 3054 3054 3054 3054
Notes: All the columns stack results from Exam 2 and 3 together. “Ever Used” in Panel A equals to 1 if a student has used the applet for at
least once for exam studying, and 0 otherwise. “#Questions” in Panel B counts the number of questions a student answers through the applet.
The estimates are the mean marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered at the lab section level (68 clusters). The network is constructed
based on the network elicited after Exam 2, using the “or” definition. The individual controls included but not shown here are gender, college
cumulative and high school GPA, cohort and lecture section dummies, and Exam 1 test score. Control mean is the mean outcome for an
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An Alternative Target Input Model
Under a target input model, a student i’s utility from spending ai amount of time on the applet
is modeled by equation (3). This model assumes that the utility increases in the target level (Ai)
and decreases in the square of the deviation from the target:
Uipaiq  Ai  pai  Aiq
2 (A.1)
The target input level, Ai, is not known when students choose how much to study. Ai is
determined by:
Ai  A  µi
where A is the mean optimal amount of time spent on the applet. The actual optimal input
level fluctuates due to student specific characteristics. The fluctuations are reflected by an
idiosyncratic shock, µi. Assume σ2µpTi  1q   σ
2
µpTi  0q and a prior belief about A that is
N(A0i, σ20i).
Students choose ai to maximize the utility specified (1). It is straightforward to see that i
should choose the input that equals to her expectation of the target level: ai  EpAiq. Therefore
the expected utility is:









With social learning, students get information about the optimal applet usage from partners
by observing their usage choice aj . aj is distributed asNpA0j, σ20j σ
2
µpTjqq  NpA0j, σ
2
µjpTjqq.
Then i Bayesian updates his/her expected utility after social learning to be:




































The same comparative statics from the main model thus follow as well.
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Estimating Endogenous Peer Effects
Consider the following general peer effects model to write a student’s outcome (yi) as a func-
























aij  1 if two are study partners and 0 otherwise. β captures the endogenous effect and δ
captures the exogenous effect. I treat students as being in one big network since most of the
students are in a densely connected component.1
Let G be the row normalized adjacency matrix, so that Gij  1ni if aij  1 and 0 otherwise.
The above equation can be written as:
y  α  βGy   γx  δGx  ε
It is well known that simply regressing y on the endogenous variable Gy is problematic.
Following Bramoullé et al. (2009) that show β can be identified as long as I , G and G2 satisfy
the independent condition. Satisfying the independence condition means that there are at least
two students who are not friends but have a common friend. The identification strategy is to
useG2x as instruments forGy. In other words, one can use friends’ friends’ characteristics to
instrument for friends’ outcomes. Since the identifying condition holds in my elicited network,
I use the instrumental variable approach with the GMM continuously updated estimator since
it is robust to potential weak instruments (Hahn et al., 2004).
Table A6 column (1) shows the results from the naive OLS regression with Gy as an en-
dogenous regressor. The endogenous peer effects estimate β is positive and statistically signif-
icant. The IV estimate is 0.006. This means that when partners on average answer one more
question through the applet, a student answers 0.006 question more. The OLS estimate is larger
than the IV estimate. This can be caused by positive selection where students using the applet
1This is different from previous studies that use the Add Health friendship data and are able to partition the
whole sample into subnetworks naturally by schools.
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more choose to study with those who also tend to use the applet more. The instrument has an
F-statistic of 2.94 which signals that the estimate is subject to weak instrument biases.
Table A6: Estimating Endogenous Peer Effects
Outcome: Applet Q’s Answered OLS IV
Endogenous Peer Effects (β) 0.179*** 0.006
(0.041) (0.352)
Individual Controls (γ) Y Y
Contextual Effects (δ) Y Y
Cragg-Donald F Stat. - 2.94
Overidentification Test p-value - 0.145
Obs. 2372 2372
Notes: All the standard errors clustered at the lab section level and are shown in the brackets (68 clus-
ters). The network is constructed based on the network elicited after Exam 2, using the “or” definition.
The regressors included but not shown here include individual background control variables such as gen-
der, college cumulative GPA before the semester starts, cohort dummies and high school GPA, partners’
average of those background variables, and lecture section fixed effects.
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APPENDIX B
Appendix for Chapter Two
110
Figure B.1: Distribution of Attendance
111
(a) Full
(b) By Gender and Attendance Brackets
Figure B.2: Attendance and Grade
Note: The attendance categories are created in this way. “Low”: fewer than 6 attendances. Mid Low:
6-10 attendances. Mid High: 11-15 attendances, High: more than 15 attendances.
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Table B.1: Course Grade and Study Group Participation
Course Grade (1) (2) (3) (4)
Study Group 0.279*** 0.293*** 0.297*** 0.317***
(0.049) (0.050) (0.066) (0.066)
Female -0.226*** -0.252*** -0.202*** -0.221***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.077) (0.076)
Female X Study Group -0.040 -0.052
(0.098) (0.105)
High School GPA 1.523*** 1.541*** 1.522*** 1.540***
(0.164) (0.167) (0.164) (0.167)
Math Performance 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.026***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Eng. Performance 0.009*** 0.007** 0.009*** 0.007***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant -6.404*** -6.167*** -6.413*** -6.178***
(0.621) (0.670) (0.622) (0.067)
Control N Y N Y
R2 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.23
N 1355 1355 1355 1355
Notes: This is an OLS specification. Study Group is a dummy variables which
equals to 1 if one is in a study group participant and 0 otherwise. The other
variables are coded the same as in Table 1. Standard errors are shown in brack-
ets. Control variables include dummies for cohort, female gender, hispanic, asian
and black ethnicity, lecture sections, and special education programs. In all re-
gressions, dummies for missing background performance measures are included.




Appendix for Chapter Three
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Figure C.1: Friends Elicitation
115
Figure C.2: Risk Preference Elicitation
116
Figure C.3: Time Preference Elicitation
117
Figure C.4: Social Preference Elicitation
Figure C.5: Self-Reported Risk Tolerance
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Figure C.6: Self-Reported Patience
119
Table C.1: Summary Statistics of Choices/Reports from the Follow-up Sample
Behavioral Measures Self-Reported Measures
Phase 1 8.53 3.21 59.5 5.76 5.88
Phase 2 8.58 3.21 59.86 5.79 6.16
Phase 3 8.17 3.51 60 5.83 6.04
Follow-up: Network 8.82 3.52 63.12 5.68 6.91
Follow-up: Lab Pool 8.45 3.36 61.04 5.77 6.7
Notes: Each column reports the average dependent variable for the three Phases of the main study, as well as for the subjects in the follow-up
study recruited using the Network Elicitation protocols and using the standard laboratory subject pool.
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Incentivized Risk Measure 0.364 -0.684
Incentivized Patience Measure -0.114 -0.657
Incentivized Generosity Measure 2.091 -5.223
Self-Reported Risk Measure -0.0793 -0.377
Self-Reported Patience Measure 0.138 -0.374
Notes: Each row reports the results of a logistic regression of the corresponding dependent variable on an indicator variable for subjects
recruited via the network elicitation survey (as compared to subjects from the standard laboratory subject pool).
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